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 Preface 
This publication is part of a series which was established in 2001 in order 
to make available teaching and learning material specifically for European 
Studies programmes throughout South Eastern Europe. The series makes 
public the results of research projects conducted in the framework of the 
“Network for ‘European Studies in South Eastern Europe” which is one of 
the major undertakings of the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe. The 
Network was founded in January 2000 and now comprises almost 40 uni-
versities and institutes both from South Eastern and Western Europe. It 
aims at establishing and strengthening interdisciplinary European Studies 
in the region by 
•  holding yearly conferences in the countries of the region 
•  organizing working groups on different topics 
•  giving advice in curricula development 
•  sending a Flying Faculty for teaching at European Studies Centers 
•  holding Train the Trainer seminars 
•  establishing Regional European Studies Centers 
•  providing a database of all programmes in the region, and 
•  publishing teaching and learning material. 
These activities are mainly financed by the German national budget for the 
Stability Pact, in close cooperation with partners like the German Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs, the German Rector’s Conference, the German Acade-
mic Exchange Service and the Hertie Foundation. Several publications of 
the series like this one have been designed as Readers. The goal is to sup-
port European Studies programmes in the region with easily accessible, 
academically profound literature on those topics of the European integra-
tion process, which have a special relevance for the region. The philosophy 
is based on the dual experience that only very few faculties in South East-
ern Europe have sufficient literature on European integration at all and that 
  5if they have such literature it reflects predominantly the West European 
viewpoint. Thus, there is a need for a new kind of literature, duly reflecting 
the needs and the experiences of the region. 
The guiding principles for these Readers are as follows: 
•  The topics chosen are of major future importance for the region.  
•  Only topics with relevance for the region as a whole are selected. 
•  Renowned, trans-nationally respected experts are chosen as authors. 
•  Authors are asked to concentrate on basic knowledge for M.A. level.  
•  The Readers are designed for professors and students alike for prac-
tical use in seminars. 
•  The goal is to get authors from all countries of the region. 
•  The Readers are available for free on the Homepage of ZEI 
http://www.zei.de/ for downloading.  
The Readers all have the same format: They start with a text written by a 
well-known West European author. The text is selected by a distinguished 
South East European author who then offers a response reflecting the ex-
perience made in the region, some didactical questions which might be dis-
cussed in class, and finally a list of basic literature. While there is a thor-
ough review process for each publication by the two editors, the Reader 
nevertheless reflects exclusively the views of the author. We hope that 
these texts will contribute to a better understanding of the European inte-
gration process among the young generation in South Eastern Europe and 
to a more substantial dialogue among scholars from the region and from 
EU countries. 
 
Dr. Rafael Biermann        Prof. Dr. Holm Sundhaussen 
Zentrum für Europäische       Osteuropa-Institut der Freien  
Integrationsforschung,  Bonn    Universität  Berlin 
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 Hans Vermeulen/Boris Slijper  
Multiculturalism and culturalism 
A social scientific critique of the political philosophy of 
multiculturalism 
Introduction
1 
During the last decade, the question of ethno-cultural diversity has been a 
central and perhaps even dominant theme in political philosophy.
2 
“Multiculturalism” became a position that was advanced as the answer by a 
large number of political philosophers, who argued that the problematic of 
multicultural societies required a reconsideration of the established 
concepts and arguments of political philosophy. Some even argued that the 
question of cultural diversity requires the introduction of new concepts and 
arguments.  
At the same time, debates among social scientists took a rather different, if 
not completely opposite turn. Increasingly, the idea of multiculturalism was 
criticized for its essentialist notions of identity, its static vision of culture, 
its primordialist understanding of ethnicity and its homogenizing treatment 
of ethnic groups. So while political philosophers felt that they had 
neglected and underestimated the importance of culture, and started to 
 
1  Reprint with the friendly permission of the authors. The paper which was not pub-
lished yet was presented at the EUROConference “Democracy Beyond the Nation-
State: Perspektives on Post-National order”, Athens, October 5 – 7, 2000. 
2  Political philosophy is of course not the only normative discipline where multicul-
turalism is discussed. Also within general ethics and the more specialized disci-
plines as medical ethics, multiculturalism has been an intensively discussed topic. 
In this paper, we shall however primarily limit ourselves to the debate over multi-
culturalism in political philosophy.  
  7argue for the “right to culture”, social scientists felt that the idea of culture 
had become more impeding than illuminating, and started “writing against 
culture”. 
We strongly feel that these critical perspectives from the social sciences are 
of major importance for the debate over multiculturalism in political 
philosophy. But until now, these two debates have not been fruitfully 
connected. The obvious huge disciplinary gap between normative and 
social scientific theories has often prevented any exchange at all. In this 
article we shall attempt to break through this unfruitful situation, and try to 
show why and how the critique of multiculturalism from the social sciences 
is important for multiculturalism as a political philosophy. 
This objective immediately poses the question of the relation between the 
social sciences and normative disciplines. How do we view the connection 
between “facts” and “values”? And what is our position in the debate 
between the proponents of contextual and those of abstract normative 
theories? Such questions are interesting, but not relevant to our purposes. 
For we think that there are at least two contributions of social scientific 
knowledge to normative theorizing that everyone can easily endorse. 
Firstly, social-scientific knowledge can contribute to a better understanding 
of what normative theorists pose as a problem (i.c. cultural diversity or the 
multicultural society). Secondly, in as far as normative considerations and 
arguments rely upon ideas about social reality (i.c. empirical, conceptual 
and theoretical notions of culture, ethnicity and identity), these ideas should 
be at least plausible from a social scientific point of view. After a 
discussion of our social scientific perspective on the concepts of culture, 
ethnicity and identity in relation to multiculturalism, we shall in the 
subsequent paragraphs explain these two points respectively. 
The debate over multiculturalism addresses a large range of themes and 
questions that we cannot deal with exhaustively. We shall therefore limit 
ourselves in two ways. Firstly, we will primarily discuss the philosophy of 
multiculturalism as an answer to ethno-cultural diversity, and largely leave 
aside questions of socio-economic and legal-political (in)equality between 
ethnic groups. Secondly, multiculturalism is sometimes presented as an 
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 answer to cultural diversity in its broadest sense. Here we will limit 
ourselves to multiculturalism as an answer to cultural diversity as a result 
of immigration. 
A last remark should be made in advance in order to avoid any 
misunderstanding of our intentions. Although the philosophy of 
multiculturalism is our object of critique, the reader should not be misled to 
believe that we in any way support its political counterparts. Indeed, had it 
not already been done so often, we could have made more or less the same 
critical arguments against conservative, assimilationist or nationalist 
ideologies. If we criticize the philosophy of multiculturalism, we do so 
from an initial sympathetic attitude towards the considerations and 
intentions at stake, and sometimes even in complete support of the 
normative conclusions reached. It is rather the way these conclusions are 
reached that deserves sociological scrutiny. In the last section we shall 
therefore offer some suggestions for a better understanding of the 
“problematic of multicultural societies”, ways of normative arguing and 
finding practical solutions that do not only stand the test of fairness and 
ethical persuasiveness, but also that of sociological sensitivity.  
1.  Culture, ethnicity and the multicultural misunder- 
standings 
What are then our objections to the way culture, ethnicity and identity are 
frequently understood in multiculturalism? For our purposes, we shall here 
limit ourselves to three related “multiculturalist misunderstandings”: (1) the 
idea that ethnic identities are “objectively given” and all-encompassing, (2) 
a culturalistic understanding the concept of culture and as a result of this 
(3) the equation of culture with ethnicity. Before we discuss more 
extensively why and how these misunderstandings undermine many current 
philosophical defenses of multiculturalism, let us first explain these 
objections themselves. 
  9Ethnic identity 
Since the late sixties, social scientists have come to distinguish the concept 
of culture from ethnicity. The importance of this distinction is now 
generally accepted, and is not confined to (extreme) constructionist 
theories, as some (e.g. Musschenga 1998: 207-208) still maintain. 
However, multiculturalists and normative theorists often fail to make this 
distinction, or even reject it. Appiah (1997) considers this as the 
multiculturalist misunderstanding. The importance to do make this 
distinction was recognized when in the 1960’s the world witnessed a 
revival of ethnic and nationalist movements. This made clear that – 
contrary the both the liberal and Marxist expectancies – the processes of 
modernization, state formation and nation building had not led to the end of 
ethnic conflicts. The revival challenged functionalist approaches that 
basically considered nations and ethnic groups as resulting from and rooted 
in objective cultural identities.
3 Ernest Gellner was among the first to 
recognize this. As he put it in his essay on nationalism from 1969: 
“Nationalism is not the awakening of nations to self-consciousness: it 
invents nations where they do not exist – but it does need some pre-existing 
differentiating marks to work on” (1969: 168). In other words, theorists 
began to realize that “ethnic solidarity might have a good deal in common 
with the phenomenon of political mobilization”, as Hechter (1975: 314) put 
it. 
We understand ethnic identity as a social identity that is characterized by a 
belief in a common culture, shared history and common descent.
4 Identity 
 
 
3  For the emergence of the concept of ethnicity, see esp. Glazer & Moynihan 1975. 
Two remarks are in order. First, the notion of an ethnic group already existed be-
fore. And second, also the need to distinguish ethnicity from culture had already 
been recognized, especially by Max Weber (1968: 389; cf. Hechter 1976; Ver-
meulen & Govers 1997: 5). 
4  We thus consider self-ascription to be the basic feature of ethnicity. Ethnicity may 
then be equated with ethnic identity. This understanding is quite broadly accepted 
since the 1970’s (see e.g. DeVos 1975: 16-17; Enloe 1973: 16; Patterson 1975: 309) 
and is distinguished from the mainstream understanding of ethnicity (still to be 
found in most dictionaries) as the sum of a number of objective feature such a 
common history, language, ancestry or religion. Our definition does leave room for 
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 is here thus defined as a subjective category.
5 Probably the most distinctive 
feature of ethnic identity is the kinship metaphor (Roosens 1994), that has 
also been described as “a myth of collective ancestry” (Horowitz 1985: 52), 
or as “an ideology of common substance” that tends to confuse biology 
with transmission of heritage (Wolf 1988: 27). Characteristic of ethnic 
ideologies is a preoccupation with ancestry and roots, or, as Hollinger has 
put it, with the “will to descend” (1997). 
The distinction between culture and ethnicity is based upon the 
understanding that one should make an analytic distinction between the 
givens of culture, history and descent on the one hand, and the way these 
are imagined in the construction of a community on the other. The 
distinction thus primarily serves to study the variable relation between on 
the one hand identity, and on the other hand culture, history and origins. 
There can for example exist a huge gap between what scholars actually 
belief to know about a history of a given nation and what a majority of the 
population and nationalist historiography presents as truth. Danforth (1995) 
for example presents three versions of Macedonian history: a Macedonian 
one, a Greek one and a scholarly one, which is his own. 
So knowledge about the history, culture and origins of an ethnic group is 
not objective or free from interpretation. On the other hand, ethnic 
identities are not completely detached from the facts, as is sometimes 
suggested in (extreme) constructionist approaches.
6 The extent to which 
ethnic identities are optional and malleable varies. Verdery (1994) 
demonstrates for example that, as a result of divergent processes of state 
formation, ethnic identities are more malleable in the peripheries of Europe 
 
a distinction between ethnic identity as group consciousness and ethnicity as group 
formation or cohesion (Hechter 1975) or as the ‘social organization of culture dif-
ference’ (Barth 1969). 
5  Sometimes the term ethnicity is applied synonymously to ethnic group. According 
to us, it is more correct to consider ethnicity as an abstract and theoretical concept, 
referring to that what makes an ethnic group. An ethnic group thus is distinct from 
other groups in the way it is imagined as a community (cf. Anderson 1983). 
  11than in Western Europe. In a similar way, the research conducted by 
Waters (1990) in the United States shows that while for the descendants of 
European immigrants from mixed origins ethnic identity is to a large extent 
optional, this does not apply to the same extent and in the same manner for 
American blacks.
7  
In the debate on multiculturalism, ethnic identity is often understood as 
synonymous to cultural identity. But the need to distinguish the two 
follows logically from the distinction between culture and ethnicity. 
Cultural identity thereby does not differ very much from culture 
(Vermeulen 1984: 12-14). The word identity here only emphasizes the 
characteristics of a specific culture, or draws attention to that what makes it 
different from others. The difference between cultural identity and ethnic 
identity also has to do with the different meanings of identity in the two 
expressions. In the former, identity means – as in mathematics and logic – 
being identical to.  
In the latter, identity has the more social-psychological denotation of 
identification. 
As a social identity, ethnic identity is but one identity besides other social 
identities, which may be based upon gender, age, region, religion, 
profession, status or class. This should be noticed, for in the 
multiculturalism debate there is a tendency to refer to identity only in the 
sense of ethnic identity. The reason to do so is usually the assumption that 
ethnic identity is a more important and fundamental identity than others, or 
even that it is an all – encompassing identity. This assumption is – although 
widely shared-broadly speaking certainly not true. 
 
6  Critiques of such postmodern-contructionist understandings of identity are to be 
found in Billig’s essay Postmodernity and identity (Billig 1995: 128 – 154) and 
Vermeulen & Govers (1997: 19 – 22). 
7  Cf. the classical essay on symbolic ethnicity by Gans (1979). 
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 Culture and culturalism 
Now that we have defined ethnicity and distinguished it from culture, it is 
time to turn to culture itself. We would prefer to adopt the rather 
straightforward definition by Löfgren (1981: 30) who defines culture as 
“the common world of experiences, values and knowledge that a certain 
social group constitutes”. At first, the word “common” may seem 
problematic, since modern notions of culture rather understand cultures as 
“contested fields” (Verdery 1994: 42) and emphasize their internal 
diversity or the “organization of difference” rather than commonality (e.g. 
Hannerz 1992: 4-15; Wallace 1966: 84-92).
8 Two remarks are therefore in 
order. First, the definition does not restrict the concept of culture to ethnic 
or national units. Once we then realize that people take part in many 
different social units, the problem of commonality versus diversity is 
largely solved. To speak for example of “Turkish culture” in terms of 
commonality is then not so say that all Turks share a common culture. 
Second, in this definition, tradition and homogeneity do not take 
precedence a priori above change and heterogeneity. Therefore, culture is a 
field of both commonality and diversity, and of both continuity and 
change. 
The way culture is conceptualized and understood by many political 
philosophers suffers from a notion of culture that is in almost every respect 
in complete contrast to our understanding, and which can generally be 
characterized as culturalistic.
9 By this is meant a vision that treats cultures 
as sharply defined homogenous, integrated and relatively static units. This 
vision is often accompanied by what one calls essentialism. This refers to 
the idea that cultures have an “essence”, “character” or even a “soul”. 
anges and transformations of cultures are interpreted as superficial: cultures 
may absorb new and “foreign” elements, but they adopt these to their own 
character. So “essentially” they do not change. Such essentialism usually 
 
8  For recent anthropological views on the concept of culture, see e.g. Keesing 1994 
and Vayda 1994. 
9  Already in 1959 Bidney extensively criticized culturalism. For an overview of this 
critique see Vermeulen 1992, 1999a & b. 
  13also implies a reification of culture: culture is presented a collective 
individual (Handler 1988) and organicistic metaphors are frequently 
applied. Lastly, a culturalistic vision usually treats culture as an 
autonomous field, more or less independent from political or economical 
structures. 
This culturalistic vision culture is in a way a congenital defect. As the 
anthropologist, Eric Wolff reminds us: 
“We need to remember that the culture concept came to the fore in a specific 
historical context, during a period when some European nations were 
contending for dominance while others were striving for separate identities and 
independence. The demonstration that each struggling nation possessed a 
distinctive society animated by its special spirit or culture served to legitimate 
its aspirations to form a separate state of its own. The notion of separate and 
integral cultures responded to this political project. (1982: 387)” 
The ‘strive for separate identity’ in Germany especially provided the 
breeding ground. The German philosopher Herder may be considered as 
the founding father of the modern notion of culture. Herder developed 
ideas about the unique and intrinsic values of cultures, and argued that 
every nation deserved its own state and could develop its culture. Through 
the German anthropologist Boas, this Herderian culture concept was 
introduced in universities of the United States, where it in many ways 
replaced the idea of race.  
Culturalistic notions played an important ideological role in the process of 
nation-building from the late 19
th century on, a process that was 
characterized by monoculturalism and an intolerance of difference (see 
Billig 1995; Goldberg 1994). The humanities – archeology, history, folk 
studies and the social sciences – played an important role in demonstrating 
the continuity, homogeneity and unity of national cultures. Related to this 
is the dominance of the theoretical perspective of structural-functionalism 
and assimilationist theories until the end of the Second World War (Esman 
1994: 5). Structural – functionalists strongly emphasized the integration of 
cultures and societies, and often neglected external influences on the social 
units they studied, whether these were villages, tribes or nation-states. 
Richard Handler (1993: 68) even goes as far as to state that “until recently, 
social scientists and nationalists spoke the same language.” 
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 Culturalistic nations are then not only unsuited for multiculturalism 
because of their sociological impracticability, but also because of its 
ideological roots in nationalism. Multiculturalism may be a critical reaction 
to the strive for cultural homogeneity inherent in nationalism, by its often 
implied culturalism it threatens only to transmit nationalist ideas to the sub-
national level. In the same spirit, Dennis Wrong argues that 
multiculturalism “in basing itself on relatively permanent groups […] 
mirrors the very prejudices it opposes” (Wrong 1997: 298). In fact, 
culturalism may even make multiculturalism look very much like the 
ideology of the new right. So Michael Billig writes: 
“As Paul Gilroy forcefully argues, there are aspects of multicultural orthodoxy 
‘which can be shown to replicate in many ways the volkish new right sense of 
the relationship between race, nation and culture’ (1992a: 57). Unless identity 
politics can transcend the nation, escaping the bounds of the homeland, the 
radicalism of the challenge to old images and narratives is critically 
constrained within the assumptions of nationalism (1995: 148).
10” 
Some ideologists of the new right have indeed incorporated elements of the 
multiculturalist ideology and philosophy. For example, the famous French 
nouveau droite philosopher Alain de Benoist states that he feels strong 
affinity for Charles Taylor’s politics of recognition (Birnbaum 1996). And 
do we not hear the (distorted) echo’s of multiculturalism in the Front 
National slogan of droit de différence (Weil & Crowley 1994; Taguieff 
1993: 124)? 
Another culturalist flaw of many multiculturalists is their lack of attention 
for processes of cultural transformation and assimilation as a result of 
external factors.
11 In their Mistaken identity (1988: 120-128) Castles, 
Kalantzis, Cope and Morissey present the example of an immigrant family 
in Australia who come from a peasant village, and describe what cultural 
 
10  See Gilroy (1992b), Lind (1995: 251 – 257), Roseberry (1992), Schierup (1995) and 
Vertovec (1996) for further discussion on the resemblance (and sometimes flirta-
tion) between multiculturalism and the ideology the ‘new right’. Also relevant is 
Verdery’s protest against ‘the new racism and sexism implicit in much identity poli-
tics’ (1994: 54). 
11  Related to this the fact that social deprivation and cultural identity are often treated 
as separated phenomena (cf. Vermeulen 1994: 54). 
  15transformation they undergo.
12 One example they mention is the changing 
perception of time as result of working in a factory. Such cultural 
transformations are not primarily a result of forced assimilation of a 
powerless minority by a majority culture. For the most part, it is the result 
of adaptation to a new social – economical and ecological context, to 
another time – and worktable, an urban environment and to welfare state 
arrangements. Besides the impact of political-economical factors on 
cultural transformation, there is the often underestimated “transformative 
power of intellectual growth”, as Hymowitz (1992) calls it. Hereby he 
refers to the cultural impact of the growing importance of schooling and 
education in modern life. Lastly, there is the transformative power of 
multiculturalism itself: one might even argue that multiculturalism itself 
contributes to cultural transformation and even assimilation. It requires, for 
example, that religious leaders and believers learn to respect other religions 
and dogmas, thereby relativising their own claims to truths. In de Swaan’s 
(1994) words, multiculturalism requires “identification with a growing 
circle”.  
2. Multiculturalism and the problematic of multicultural 
societies 
Let us now turn to what this critique means for multiculturalism as a 
philosophy, and start with the way normative theorists understand their 
subject: the problematic of multicultural societies. It strikes us that in the 
many publications on multiculturalism by normative theorists one hardly 
finds any reflection upon what is presented as the problem to be solved: 
political conflicts and ethical dilemmas arising from cultural diversity. 
Often, this problematic is sketched in just a few opening sentences, as if it 
could be taken for granted. Will Kymlicka’s famous Multicultural 
Citizenship provides a good example. In his introduction he states: 
“Most countries today are culturally diverse. According to recent estimates, the 
world’s 184 independent states contain over 600 language groups, and 5000 
 
12  Cf. the critique of Fincher, Campbell and Webber (1993). 
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 ethnic groups. In very few countries can the citizens be said to share the same 
language, or belong to the same ethno-national group. This diversity gives rise 
to a series of important and potentially divisive questions (1995: 1).” 
The first two sentences suggest that ethnic diversity may be equated to 
cultural diversity. Indeed, the word ‘today’ in the first sentence suggests 
that cultural diversity within states has increased. In the last sentence he 
suggests that it is this diversity itself that raises questions. The problematic 
nature of cultural diversity is, so to speak, presented as almost intrinsic to 
cultural diversity itself. It should not come as a surprise that the author 
presents multiculturalism as the answer. Kymlicka is no exception, and it 
may be no coincidence that the word multiculturalism in many texts often 
refers to both the fact of cultural diversity as well as to the philosophical 
answer. There seems to be no need to distinguish the two meanings. 
However, both the fact of cultural diversity itself as the idea that cultural 
diversity is the problem should be seriously put into perspective and can in 
some ways even be seriously challenged. 
Multiculturalism and cultural diversity 
Let us start with the fact of cultural diversity. Is it true that intra – state 
cultural diversity is an important characteristic of today’s societies, and that 
indeed this cultural diversity is even increasing? The philosopher and 
expert by experience Appiah is not impressed by what is often thought of 
as the most multicultural society of our days, the United States: 
“Coming, as I do, from Ghana, I find the broad cultural homogeneity of 
America more striking than its much – vaunted variety. Take language. When I 
was a child, we lived in a household where there were always at least three 
mother tongues in daily use: we spoke English (Ghana's official language and 
my mother's) and Twi (my father's first language); and our cook and steward, 
who came from further north, also spoke the language of Navrongo, where they 
were born. (The watchman spoke Hausa.) Ghana, with a population smaller 
than that of New York State, has several dozen languages in active daily use 
and no one language that is spoken at home — or even fluently understood — 
by a majority of the population. So why, in this society, which has less 
diversity of culture than most others, are we so preoccupied with diversity and 
so inclined to conceive of it as cultural?” 
  17Although many authors contrast the current cultural diversity of states with 
a homogenous past, this notion does not rest on any systematic comparison, 
and one can even seriously question if it is true at all. 
Gellner (1983) points out that in the course of history many languages and 
ethnic groups have disappeared. In some regions, such as the Balkans, 
ethno-cultural diversity has decreased drastically; a development that still 
goes on today (Brubaker 1996 and 1998). Migration does not only lead to 
ethnic mixing, but also leads to ethnic unmixing, as Brubaker puts it. 
Also in the case of immigration countries it is questionable whether 
immigration has in fact really led to an increase of the cultural diversity of 
these societies. Especially historians and historical social scientists often 
object to the picture of a sharp contrast between a cultural homogenous 
past and a multicultural present. Melleuish (1998: 102) for example is 
inclined to accept the idea that Australia is nowadays more multicultural, 
but he strongly objects to the vision of a monocultural past. Collinson 
(1993) too notices that multiculturalism implicitly affirms the nationalist 
myth of a monocultural past. Historian David Hollinger (1995) goes ever 
further, and argues that at the beginning of the 20
th century the United 
States were even more culturally diverse than today.  
But do we not underestimate the nature and impact of current migration? 
Do not experts on migration agree that international migration will be a 
permanent phenomenon? And is it not true that recent migrants to Western 
countries increasingly come from even more afar, and now also include 
those who are perceived as racially different? All this is true, but the impact 
of current immigration on the cultural diversity of the receiving societies 
should not be overestimated. 
In the first place one should not forget that in the past many immigrants 
that are nowadays considered as belonging to the same (Western or 
European) culture were then conceived of as culturally different, as 
difficult to assimilate, and often even as belonging to a different race. In 
this sense, South and East European immigrants to the United States have 
only recently become “white” as Appiah (1997) reminds us. Second, we 
should realize that for several reasons the “stranger” has become more and 
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 more similar to us, as Nauta (1994) has put it. As a result of cultural 
globalization many immigrants are much more familiar with the culture of 
the receiving countries then in the past. Current immigrants to the United 
States from non – European regions are, as Wrong (1997: 299) says, 
“probably less unfamiliar with the major features of the society than were, 
say, South Italian or Slavic peasants in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth century”. Related to this is the worldwide process of increasing 
deruralization, a process that according to Wallerstein (1999) will be 
completed within some 25 years. This will have an important cultural 
impact, as the experience of a peasant life has always been an important 
source for cultural difference for immigrants. And lastly, the present 
immigration regulations in many countries add to this that mainly high – 
educated and wealthy immigrants are admitted. In Australia, for instance, 
the majority of recent immigrants have a proficiency in English before 
entry. 
Instead of contrasting the homogenous past to a multicultural present, it 
seems more sensible to contrast the ideology of homogeneity and 
monoculturalism of the past to the ideology of multiculturalism of today. 
Whereas the ideology of monoculturalism has neglected or even denied the 
cultural diversity of the past, the ideology of multiculturalism exaggerates 
the cultural diversity of the present. 
Multiculturalism and the politics of recognition 
Normative theorists could agree with our critical comments so far, but they 
might argue that they are irrelevant for the questions at stake. They might 
add that, though we have put the current extent of cultural diversity into 
perspective, we do not deny it all together. And moreover, we miss the 
politically relevant question. The point at issue, the critics might continue, 
is that we are confronted with a politics of recognition, a political 
movement of ethnic minorities striving for recognition of their cultural 
identities. And the multiculturalists among normative theorists argue that – 
contrary to the dominant ideology – these demands are justified and require 
an answer. But again, this could be seriously challenged. 
  19First of all, the support for a politics of recognition among ethnic minority 
groups should not be overestimated. It is for example striking that in the 
two countries where multiculturalism became an official government 
policy – twenty years before it was defended by political philosophers – 
there was hardly any organized political demand for the idea of 
multiculturalism. In his detailed study of the origins of the multicultural 
policies in Australia, Lopez (1997) concludes that “[M]ulticulturalism was 
not the product of a broad ethnic social movement advocating 
multiculturalism; successive attempts by multiculturalists to establish a 
social movement were unsuccessful”. It was a small, but effective lobby of 
ethnic leaders, social scientists and politicians that was involved in the 
establishment of multiculturalism. The development of multicultural 
policies in Canada was quite similar. Although the ethnic leaders who 
constituted the lobby for multiculturalism presented themselves as 
representing a Third Force, one of the social scientists who was actively 
involved in the development of the policy in retrospect remarked that 
‘[T]he demand for a federal policy of multiculturalism seems to have come 
primarily from ethnic organizational elites and their supporters, from 
government agencies and from political authorities’ (Breton 1986: 48).  
Second, one could question whether the demand for recognition for one’s 
cultural identity is actually connected with real cultural differences. When 
we recall the above mentioned distinction between culture and ethnic 
identity, we may as Appiah “wonder, in fact, whether there isn’t a 
connection between the thinning of the cultural content of identities and the 
rising stridency of their claims” (1997). Or, as Dennis Wrong puts it:  
“The rise of multiculturalism does not reflect an increase in the cultural 
diversity of American society at large, but if anything the reverse. […] The 
cultural differences invoked by multiculturalists are fundamentally identity 
markers or labels rather than ways of life or sets of values that contrast sharply 
with those of most native-born Americans (Wrong 1997: 299).” 
In other words, multiculturalism (as an ideology and movement) may rather 
be an expression of the need for identity as a result of a decline of real 
cultural differences, a suggestion that has been put forward by others as 
well (e.g. Blok 1998; Reitz 1980: 44-35). Social scientific research often 
affirmed this conclusion. In his study on ethno-regional movements in 
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 France, DeBeer (1980: 115) observed that ethnic leaders in many ways 
bear more resemblance to leaders of other militant political movements 
than to their rank and file. They often learned about their own culture, such 
as their language, at an advanced age (cf. Inghold 1984). Studies of ethnic 
movements of immigrants often reach the same conclusions. Especially 
Roosens (1989: 150-151) emphasizes that in order to claim one’s own 
culture as a right, one first needs to distance oneself from that culture, and 
to be familiar with the standpoint of cultural relativism. Those who live in a 
relatively stable traditional culture are usually not aware of their difference, 
let alone that they could value it, or claim it as a right. One should therefore 
realize that in many cases ethnic movements use the terminology of 
“culture” and “identity” strategically. In a democratic system that is 
characterized by a widespread, everyday cultural relativism, demands made 
with an appeal to culture attain a strong moral appeal to the majority 
(Roosens 1989). This applies even more to those societies that are familiar 
with the terminology and ideology of multiculturalism or where it even is 
an official state ideology and policy like Canada and Australia. 
In sum, we seriously challenge the assumptions about what constitutes the 
problematic of multicultural societies that underlie appeals for 
multiculturalism. Today’s cultural diversity of societies, including those of 
immigrant countries, should not be overestimated, and calls for recognition 
of cultural identity should be evaluated critically.
13 This may seem a form 
of  Ideologiekritik, accusing multiculturalists and their philosophical 
defenders of false consciousness, or at least a form of sociological pedantry 
towards layman in the field of ethnic studies and the sociology of culture. 
However, we simply assume that an adequate understanding of political 
and moral controversies is indispensable for good normative reflection. So 
a more critical understanding of the reality of “multicultural” societies and 
the politics of multiculturalism serves a practical purpose for normative 
theorizing. It may lead to realize that in this debate in many cases culture or 
 
13  Needless to say that this last warning of course also counts for appeals for recogni-
tion and protection of national majority cultures. 
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not be the solution. 
3. The arguments for multiculturalism 
Multiculturalists do not only reject a policy of forced assimilation of 
minorities. In fact, almost all normative theorists are in broad agreement 
over the idea that the established democratic rights would prevent such a 
policy. Multiculturalists however argue for some form of public 
recognition of minority cultures, by means of legislation or policies. For 
that purpose, multiculturalists insist that cultural identity should be 
conceived of as something that deserves an autonomous moral 
consideration. Following Kymlicka (1998: 154) we distinguish three kinds 
of arguments that are put forward by normative theorists. The first one is 
that cultures have an intrinsic value, the second is that cultural identity is 
important for individual autonomy, and the third argument we may 
distinguish stresses the importance of cultural identity for our personal 
identity. 
Intrinsic value 
An important argument for “the right to culture” is the idea that cultures 
and cultural diversity have an intrinsic value. This idea has been – although 
in different ways – put forward and defended by Dworkin (1993), Raz 
(1994), Rockefeller (1992) and Taylor (1992). In the Netherlands, 
especially Musschenga (1998) has defended this idea. The notion of 
intrinsic value is based upon the idea that the value of something thrusts 
itself upon us, independent of our assessment. As Dworkin describes it: 
“Something is intrinsically valuable […] if its value is independent of what 
people happen to enjoy or want or need or what is good for them. Most of 
us treat at least some objects or events as intrinsically valuable in that way: 
we think we should admire and protect them because they are important in 
themselves, and not just if or because we or others want or enjoy them “ 
(Dworkin 1993: 71-72, cf. Beauchamps 1991: 138). 
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 The argument that cultures should be valued intrinsically implies a 
multiculturalism that aims at not just respect for or recognition of cultures, 
but at their preservation. As such, there are important analogies with the 
arguments for nature conservation and the preservation of natural species. 
One frequently encounters biological and organic metaphors. Rockefeller 
for example argues: 
It may be argued that human cultures are themselves like life forms. They are 
the product of natural evolutionary processes of organic growth. […] Each has 
its own place in the larger scheme of things, and each possesses intrinsic value 
quite apart from whatever value its traditions may have for other cultures. This 
fact is not altered by the consideration that, like living beings, cultures may 
develop into disintegrated and diseased forms (Rockefeller 1992: 94). 
The intrinsic value of cultures is also often framed in a religious 
vocabulary. Rockefeller for example argues that cultures may be 
considered as sacred (1992: 96). Similarly, Taylor writes that he can not 
rule out the Herderian idea of “divine providence, according to which all 
this diversity was not a mere accident but was meant to bring about a 
greater harmony” (1992: 72). 
The first problem with this line of reasoning arises with the notion of 
intrinsic value itself. As an ethical notion, it can of course not be 
scrutinized sociologically, but only internally. But it seems that most 
authors in practice do not take cultures to be intrinsically valuable in the 
sense that their value is independent of our assessment. For if we take 
cultures to have an intrinsic value, it would follow that they also have an 
equal value. Most authors, however, reject this conclusion. The earlier cited 
Rockefeller, for example, speaks of “diseased” cultures. And Raz argues 
that cultures only have an intrinsic value in as far as they represent true 
values (1994: 74), thereby excluding reprehensible, “illiberal” cultures. 
This indicates that, implicitly, the intrinsic value of cultures is not at all 
“independent”, but indeed dependent upon the philosopher’s evaluation. 
This also becomes clear by the fact that for many authors the intrinsic value 
of a culture seems to increase when cultures are rare and peculiar, like 
pandas have more value than ants for conservationists. Margalit and 
Halbertal (1994) for example argue that the state has a particular duty to 
protect cultures that are threatened to disappear, while Musschenga (1998: 
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are alien to them”. This too indicates that the intrinsic value is in fact 
extrinsic: the value of a culture is determined by the protectionist outsider. 
As Hannerz rightfully reminds us: 
“Watching out for people’s right to choose must not be confused [...] with 
safeguarding a specific cultural heritage, or cultural diversity generally, for its 
own sake – the ‘monument to human creativity’ idea. Such safeguarding may 
be based on a judgment of mostly esthetic and antiquarian nature, and is often 
based on vicarious pleasure: it often seems to be outsiders who reach such a 
conclusion, and grieve for the cultures others leave behind (Hannerz 1996: 
58).” 
Hannerz’ warning brings us to a second objection. Even if one accepts the 
moral notion that some things may have an intrinsic value, it is highly 
questionable whether it makes any sense to speak of the intrinsic value of 
“a culture”, a term that in any conception usually refers to a variety of 
things. What exactly is then referred to with the term “culture”, what 
exactly is to be valued? Unless it is specified what exactly is meant, the 
practical meaning of the intrinsic value of a culture remains unclear. On the 
other hand, once the meaning of culture is specified, the idea of intrinsic 
value is difficult to reconcile with cultural transformation and internal 
heterogeneity. How can we attribute an intrinsic value to something that is 
subject to change and diverging evaluations?  
To understand the dynamic and internal heterogeneity of cultures has even 
more consequences for the kind of multiculturalism that follows from the 
argument of intrinsic value. The “right to culture” is here usually translated 
into a plea for protection and preservation of cultures, or – as in Taylor – 
into a defense of a politics of survivance. As this by definition cannot mean 
to be anything else than to preserve a specific cultural heritage, it goes 
counter to the “nature” of culture (cf. Habermas 1995). And lastly, in 
political terms such protectionist multiculturalism may be qualified as 
outright conservative. As the earlier cited Hannerz remarks: 
“To make sure that existing varieties of cultures are preserved as living entities, 
obviously we would have to transform ‘the right to one’s own culture’ into a duty to 
that culture. And that would no doubt be a great deal more controversial (Hannerz 
1996: 58).” 
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 Indeed, such a multiculturalism is not a reaction to nationalism, but a rather 
a variation of it. 
Culture and autonomy 
The argument that culture has an intrinsic value may be qualified as a 
conservative defense of multiculturalism. There are however also 
normative theorists who defend a multiculturalist theory based on the 
liberal principles of individual freedom and equality. The moral relevance 
of cultural identity is here not conceived of as intrinsic, but as 
instrumentally valuable. 
This line of arguing is most thoroughly explored and developed by Will 
Kymlicka in his Multicultural Citizenship.
14 Although in this work his 
primary subject is the position of national minorities, he also argues that 
immigrant ethnic minorities may rightfully claim special rights (Kymlicka 
himself speaks here of “polyethnic” rights). These rights are aimed at 
external protection of immigrant ethnic cultures against involuntary 
assimilation by the majority culture. 
His central argument for this right is that one’s own culture constitutes, as 
he calls it, a context of choice: 
“[...] freedom of choice is dependent on social practices, cultural meanings, and 
a shared language. Our capacity to form and revise a conception of the good is 
intimately tied to our membership in a societal culture, since the context of 
individual choice is the range of options passed down to us by our culture. 
Deciding how to lead our live is, in the first instance, a matter of exploring the 
possibilities made available by our culture. (Kymlicka, 1995:126, see also 83)” 
This idea of culture as a context of choice implies that the protection of 
culture is consistent with, or even a prerequisite for liberal principles: by 
protecting someone’s culture we protect his individual freedom. For 
normative purposes, this argument seems quite consistent. But the idea that 
 
14  See for very similar arguments Raz (1994) and Margalit & Halbertal (1994). In fact, 
Kymlicka’s Multicultural citizenship heavily relies on the central arguments about 
the value of culture developed by these authors. 
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indeed highly disputable. 
First of all, his theory lacks a clear and consistent notion of culture. Indeed, 
although an understanding of culture seems pivotal for his argument, his 
usage is extremely slippery. At some places he states that he understands 
cultures as more or less synonymous to nation or people (18), while at 
others he speaks of cultures in terms of “societal cultures” that are 
“territorially concentrated”, by which culture seems to mean society (76). 
At yet other moments he speaks of cultural diversity within societies, 
whereby culture seems to refer to ethnic culture (11, 77). Sometimes 
culture is used synonymous to (often religious) worldviews or ideologies 
(152), while at other times he seems to equate culture with language 
groups, for example when he speaks of “Anglophone culture” (79). 
More important however are his strongly culturalistic notion of culture, and 
his failure to distinguish culture from ethnicity. He often seems to believe 
that ethnic groups are culturally homogenous social categories. For 
example, we learn that immigrants “bring with them a shared vocabulary of 
tradition and convention” (77). He often speaks of ethnic groups as if they 
were strongly integrated communities that act collectively: ethnic groups 
“want” and “claim” things, and they “resist”. Sometimes even culture as 
such is personified: “It’s up to each culture to decide” (104). Since he 
insists that culture as a context of choice is limited to one’s own culture, 
Kymlicka seems to suggest that only within our own culture we can act 
meaningfully. Indeed, he approvingly cites Margalit and Raz (1990) who 
state that “familiarity with a culture determines the boundaries of the 
imaginable” (Kymlicka 1995: 89). Such a deterministic view may even be 
qualified as vulgar cultural relativism. 
One could perhaps argue that Kymlicka’s usage of the notion of culture is 
indeed confusing and sociologically naive, but that this does not disqualify 
the general argument. However, his culturalistic perspective is more than 
an unfortunate choice of words in an attempt to formulate an otherwise 
sensible argument. On the contrary, his argument relies on culturalistic 
asumptions in a very substantial way. For once we realize that cultural 
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 contents are inherently dynamic and variable, that ethnic groups do not 
share an uncontested and homogenous culture and that our individual 
identity is constructed by many social groups and cultural sources, then the 
idea of culture as a context of choice loses its impact. We may of course 
maintain that culture is a context of choice in the sense that people make 
choices in a cultural context, but this is trivial. Making significant choices 
people of course require “culture”, but not necessarily – let alone 
exclusively – their own. From a non-culturalistic perspective, the idea that 
“deciding how to lead our live is, in the first instance, a matter of exploring 
the possibilities made available by our culture” becomes untenable. 
The rejection of culturalistic notions also has consequences for Kymlicka’s 
concrete conception of “multicultural citizenship”. For immigrant ethnic 
minorities, multicultural citizenship implies according to him that they are 
entitled to “polyethnic rights” aimed at preserving and enhancing their 
cultures. As examples of such rights Kymlicka mentions financial 
assistance for ethnic organizations, the arts, festivals, museums, publication 
of books and newspapers in immigrant languages and heritage languages 
classes (31). The problem is not that there are no sensible arguments for 
such measures, and even less so that they are unjust. The question is rather 
whether such measures according to Kymlicka should be considered as a 
“right” because they protect an individual’s “context of choice”. First, it is 
highly questionable that individual immigrants and their descendants are so 
much attached to their cultural background that without financial support 
for its reproduction we are limiting their choices. And it is even more 
questionable whether this holds for ethnic minorities in general (a fair 
requirement when arguing for a “right”). Second, Kymlicka’s plea for 
polyethnic rights seems to be based on the assumption that immigrant 
ethnic groups will forever continue to exist as ethnic groups. In practice, 
the impact and importance of the ethnic cultures and identities of 
immigrant groups is likely to decrease over time and certainly over 
generations, when often the distinction between majority and minority 
cultures at a group level can no longer be made. Is it reasonable to argue 
for protection of ethnic cultures of the second or third generation 
immigrants who are already highly integrated or perhaps even assimilated? 
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sharply defined set of elements shared by all “members” of the ethnic 
group, to talk of “protection of culture” seems useless, and concrete 
operationalization in terms of rights or policies impossible. For practical 
purposes not only a more specific and disaggregated terminology is needed 
for what actually counts as culture (beliefs, knowledge, artefacts, history, 
language?) as well as standards that indicate what culture may qualify for 
protection. 
Cultural identity and self-esteem 
A third argument we find in multiculturalist normative theories is the idea 
that recognition of (group) identity is a necessary precondition for one’s 
individual well-being. Or, to put it more precisely, that a positive 
recognition of the ethno-cultural identity of a group leads to a positive self-
image of individuals within that group, and vice versa. 
In a more philosophical vocabulary this argument has been put forward by 
Charles Taylor in his famous essay The politics of recognition: 
“The thesis is that our identity is partly shaped by recognition or its absence, 
often by the misrecognition of others, and so a person or group of people can 
suffer real damage, real distortion, if the people or society around them mirror 
back to them a confining or demeaning or centemptible picture of themselves. 
Nonrecognition or misrecognition can inflict harm, can be a form of 
oppression, imprisoning someone in a false, distorted, and reduced mode of 
being (1992: 25).” 
Taylor therefore concludes that “due recognition is not just a courtesy we 
owe to people. It is a vital human need” (26). Although from a completely 
different philosophical tradition, we find a similar argument in Iris Young’s 
Justice and the politics of difference (1990). Young draws our attention to a 
subtle process of suppression of ethnic minorities that she refers to as 
cultural imperialism. This process is characterized by three aspects: (1) in 
public life, minority groups are compelled to adjust to the norms and values 
of the dominant group’s culture; (2) these dominant norms and values bear 
the semblance of impartiality and universality, whereby only the minority 
cultures are considered as particular and deviant, which (3) leads to the 
suppression of one’s identity, loss of self-esteem and even to self-hatred 
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 (164-165). Minorities are therefore confronted with ‘an irresolvable 
dilemma: to participate means to accept and adopt an identity one is not, 
and try to participate means to be reminded by oneself and others of the 
identity one is’ (165). 
The argument of self-esteem or self-respect seems convincing by its strong 
moral appeal and by its simplicity and familiarity. Contrary to appeals to 
intrinsic value and culture as a context of choice, the argument of self-
respect is often appealed to by not only philosophers, but also by politicians 
and policymakers. The then Canadian Prime Minister Trudeau for example 
referred to it when he proclaimed his official multiculturalism policy in 
1971. He even elaborated the argument, adding to it that self-respect was of 
political importance: self-respect was a precondition for good citizenship: 
“[…] national unity, if it is to mean anything in the deeply personal sense, must 
be founded on a confidence of one’s own individual identity; out of this can 
grow respect for that of others and a willingness to share ideas, attitudes and 
assumptions (House of Commons 1971. Cit. in: Fleras & Elliot 1992: 281).” 
Since the seventies, the argument of self-respect has therefore been 
considered as “the multicultural assumption” (Burnet 1995). Also, in the 
Dutch minorities policy the idea has played an important role (Lucassen & 
Köbben 1992: 117-118). 
The argument also seems more convincing from a social scientific point of 
view. Many will be familiar with the stories of groups like the Burakumin, 
who as a result of centuries of discrimination and stigmatization are often 
said to hardly have considered themselves to be human. The classical study 
by Elias and Scotson (1976) on “established and outsiders” in London 
seems to demonstrate that a stigmatized group of outsiders internalizes a 
negative self-image, even in the absence of ethno-racial of cultural 
differences. It also suggest that in turn this perpetuates inequality. 
Notwithstanding all this, the argument is not indisputable. The negative 
relation between misrecognition and self-respect has often proved to be less 
unambiguous than suggested. 
First, one often fails to make a distinction between the image a person has 
of the group to which he or she belongs (we-image) and the image a person 
has of him- or herself (self-image). Implicitly it is often assumed that the 
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groups and is also an individual. It turns out that in many situations, for 
example among young people, a person’s self-image is only partly 
determined by the image that person has (or other have) of the ethnic or 
racial group (Verkuyten 1992; Vermeulen 1984). Other factors, such as 
body image, are often more important for one’s self-image (Verkuyten 
1992: 142). Second, it appears that individual members of ethnic groups 
not always suffer from a negative self-image or from a negative we-image. 
This discussion understandably played an important role in the case of the 
black Americans. But already in 1979 a survey study conducted by Porter 
& Washington led to the conclusion that the self-image of black Americans 
was in this respect not substantially different from that of white Americans. 
Recent research among black Americans also demonstrates that it is 
difficult to indicate to what extent the image of one’s ethnic groups 
determines a person’s global self-image (Verkuyten 1999). A study by 
Maykel Verkuyten conducted among ethnic minority youth in the 
Netherlands showed that there is a certain correlation between a negative 
image of one’s ethnic group and a person’s self-esteem, but it is certainly 
neither predominant nor unequivocal. For example, it appeared that in 
many cases one was indeed aware of a negative image of his ethnic group 
among the majority, but there were no clear indications that this negative 
image was internalized. Turkish youth even showed a higher self-esteem 
than Dutch youth (75-76). 
5. Multiculturalism without culturalism 
Where does all this lead to? In our introduction, we stated that it was 
certainly not our purpose to discard everything advocated by 
multiculturalist normative theorists. Neither do we wish to suggest that in 
actual multicultural societies there are no political controversies that 
deserve ethical reflection. We therefore argue for a continuation of ethical 
reflection and theory development on the questions of multicultural 
societies that are more sociological sensible, and free from the disputable 
and inadequate presuppositions we have criticized in the above. Such 
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 “multiculturalism without culturalism” would have at least three 
consequences. 
Disaggregating “culture”  
A first consequence would be to recognize that “culture” is an impractical 
concept for normative theorizing. Both in form and content, it may refer to 
such a variety of phenomena that the practical impact of pleas for “a right 
to culture” or “recognition of culture” is either unclear or too encompassing 
and usually both. In seems more sensible to disaggregate the concept of 
culture and thereby the fact of intra-state cultural diversity into different 
dimensions. One could for example think of distinguishing such dimension 
as language, values, norms, religious beliefs and practices, the Arts, 
cultural artifacts and histories. Such a distinction has at least four 
advantages. First, it is more realistic in the sense that it does not presuppose 
an a priori integration of all these fields into a shared and distinguishable 
“culture”. A second advantage is that it may result in a more perspicuous 
debate on what is exactly at stake, and what exactly is referred to when one 
argues in favour of the recognition and rights of minority cultures. Thirdly, 
disaggregating the concept of culture will also show that not all dimensions 
lend themselves for a single ethical principle, argument or consideration. 
Some may even show unsuited for political philosophical reflection in the 
sense that they do not primarily manifest themselves at the level of state-
citizen relations, or cannot be translated into rights and policies. And lastly, 
distinguishing these different dimensions makes clear that the issues at 
stake in the pleas for multiculturalism or multicultural citizenship are not 
always as new as is often suggested, and may not require reconsideration of 
established political philosophical categories and arguments, let alone 
developing and introducing new ones. 
“Deculturalizing” the problematic of multicultural societies 
This last point also allows us to “deculturalize” many immigrants claims 
that are now understood as constituting the problematic of multicultural 
societies. Disaggregating the concept of culture makes clear that in many 
cases, “culture” is not the problem, and therefore “multiculturalism” is not 
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political philosophers have raised as examples of the problematic of 
multicultural societies, the reader is immediately struck by the fact that in 
many cases the question seems to be about religion and religious diversity. 
Favorite questions are “should Muslims be allowed to wear headscarves in 
public institutions such as schools?”, or “can such practices as polygamy 
and female circumcision be tolerated?” In fact, in many cases these 
examples are not even related to (immigrant) ethnic groups. The literature 
is teeming with orthodox Jews, Old Order Amish, Mormons and 
Mennonites (e.g. Guttman 1993; Kymlicka 1995; Margalit & Halbertal 
1994). In fact the debate is then about the meaning of secularism or the 
problem of value pluralism and the limits of toleration. It is unclear why 
such questions are presented as a “new” theme for political philosophy. Are 
these not the oldest (and maybe even the original) questions of political 
philosophy? It is just that some societies are now confronted with one or 
two new religions, which makes the subject topical again, but not new. It is 
then also unclear why such questions and their proposed answers are now 
framed in terms of culture and identity. Do we not already have the ethical 
and political vocabulary and arguments to understand and answer these 
questions? In other words, when we “deculturalize” the problematic of 
multicultural societies, we may realize that in a large number of cases 
answering actual questions and conflicts may not be a matter of arguing for 
the moral relevance of culture and identity and developing theories of 
“polyethnic rights” or “multicultural citizenship”, but simply a matter of 
universalizing already established human rights. In this respect, it may be 
instructive to reread John Stuart Mill’s famous On liberty. In this essay, 
Mill already in 1859 discussed the justness of imposing an obligatory 
Sunday rest on Jews, and the forbidding of the Mormon’s practice of 
polygamy (1989: 90-91), two examples that nowadays are frequently 
mentioned as paradigmatic questions of today’s multicultural societies. 
And while Mill simply framed and answered these questions in terms of the 
rights of individual freedom, in their recurrence as Islamic practices, these 
questions are suddenly reframed in terms of culture and cultural rights.  
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 Mill’s answers to these questions also reveal that we may even question 
whether multiculturalism’s moral recognition of culture leads to more 
respect for minority cultures and more toleration for cultural differences. 
For Mill concluded that taking the rights to individual freedom of the 
Mormon’s seriously implied that the practice of polygamy could not be 
prohibited by the state simply because the majority disapproves of it. For 
most multiculturalist normative theorists however, polygamy is the 
paradigmatic example of a practice where the “right to culture” stops, and 
the protection of basic human rights begins. So paradoxically, while an 
appeal to the moral importance of cultural identity is presented as a plea for 
more tolerance and respect for cultural diversity, calling practices and 
claims “cultural” also serves to draw to the limits of diversity more easily 
and strictly than if they were recognized as religious practices and claims, 
thereby falling under the category of religious rights and freedoms 
Taking cultural transformation and internal heterogeneity seriously 
A third consequence of a non-culturalistic multiculturalism is to take 
cultural transformation and internal heterogeneity of ethnic minority 
cultures seriously. This is an important fact in relation to arguments for 
financial or other forms of support for the expression or preservation of 
elements of minority cultures. A good example is the support for ethnic 
minority languages, for example through language classes in the public 
educational system. We would not contend that there are no good 
arguments at all for such language classes. But taking cultural change and 
internal heterogeneity seriously does mean that it does not make much 
sense to consider the maintenance of immigrant languages as a “right”, 
much less so to be translated in an official legal right. Measures that are 
aimed at the support for elements of ethnic minority cultures should 
therefore better to be considered not as rights, but as possible and 
justifiable policy options. As such, they may be introduced when there is a 
clear demand, they can be altered as a result of changing circumstances, 
and they can be abolished when the target-group is integrated or when there 
is evidence that a majority shows no interest in preserving their ancestor’s 
culture.  
  33Literature 
Anderson, Benedict, Imagined communities. Reflections on the origins and 
spread of nationalism. London: Verso, 1983. 
Appiah, K. Anthony, “The multiculturalist misunderstanding.” The New 
York Review of Books 44, 15: 30 – 36, 1997. 
Barth, Frederick (ed.), Ethnic groups and boundaries. The social organiza-
tion of culture. Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1969. 
Beauchamp, Tom L., Philosophical ethics. An introduction to moral phi-
losophy. New York: McGray - Hill,Inc., 1991. 
Billig, Michael, Banal nationalism. London: Sage, 1995. 
Birnbaum, Pierre, “From multiculturalism to nationalism.” Political Theory 
24(1): 33 – 45, 1996. 
Blok, Anton, “The narcissism of minor differences.” European Journal of 
Social Theory 1: 33 – 56, 1998. 
Breton, Raymond, “Multiculturalism and Canadian nationbuilding.” In: 
Alan C. Cairns & Cynthia Williams (eds.), The politics of gender, ethnicity 
and language in Canada, 27 – 66. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 
1986. 
Brubaker, Rogers, “Nationalizing states in the old `New Europe' - and the 
new.' Etnic and Racial Studies” 19(2): 411 – 437, 1996. 
Ibid., “Migrations of ethnic unmixing in the `New Europe'.” International 
Migration Review 32: 1047 – 1065, 1998. 
Burnet, Jean, “Multiculturalism and racism in Canada.” In: Jan Hjarno 
(ed.), Multiculturalism in the Nordic societies, Proceedings of the 9
th Nor-
dic seminar for researchers on migration and ethnic relations. 43 - 50. Co-
penhagen: TemaNord, Castles, Stephen, Mary Kalantzis, Bill Cope & M. 
Morrissey, 1995. 
  34 
 Castles, Stephen, Mary, Kalantzis, Bill, Cope, & M. Morrissey: Mistaken 
identity. Multiculturalism and the demise of nationalism in Australia. Syd-
ney: Pluto Press, 1988. 
Collinson, Sarah, Beyond borders. West European migration policy to-
wards the 21
st century. London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 
1993. 
DeBeer, William R., The unexpected rebellion. Ethnic activism in 
contemporary France. New York: New York University Press, 1980. 
DeVos, George, “Ethnic pluralism. Conflict and accomodation.” In: 
George DeVos & Lola Romanucci- Ross (eds.), Ethnic identity. Cultural 
continuities and change, 5 – 41. Palo Alto: Mayfield Press, 1975. 
Dworkin, Ronald, Life's dominion. An argument about abortion, euthanasia 
and individual freedom. New York: Alfred Knopf, 1993. 
Elias, Norbert & John L. Scotson, De gevestigden en de buitenstaanders. 
Een studie van de spanningen en machtsverhoudingen tussen twee arbei-
dersbuurten. Utrecht: Uitgeverij Het Spectrum, 1976. 
Enloe, Cynthia, Ethnic conflict and political development. An analytical 
study. Boston: Little, Brown, 1973. 
Esman, Milton J., Ethnic politics. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994. 
Fincher, Ruth, Iain Campell & Michael Webber, “Multiculturalism, settle-
ment and migrants' employment strategies.” In: Gordon L. Clark, Dean 
Forbes & Roderick Francis (eds.), Multiculturalism, difference and post-
modernism, 103 - 125. Melbourne: Longman Cheshire, 1993. 
Fleras, A. & J.L. Elliott, Multiculturalism in Canada. The challenge of di-
versity. Scarborough: Nelson Canada, 1992. 
Gans Herbert J., “Symbolic ethnicity. The future of ethnic groups and cul-
tures in America.” Ethnic and Racial Studies 2: 1 – 20, 1979. 
  35Gellner, Ernest, “Nationalism.” In: Thought and change. 147 - 178. Lon-
don: Weidenfels and Nicolson, 1969. 
Ibid., Nations and nationalism. Oxford: Blackwell, 1983. 
Gilroy, Paul, “Cultural studies and ethnic absolutism.” In: Lawrence 
Grossberg, Cary Nelson & Paula A. Treichler (eds.), Cultural studies, Lon-
don: Routledge, 1992a. 
Ibid., “The end of antiracism.” In: James Donald & Ali Ratansi (eds.), 
'Race', culture and difference, 49 - 61. London: Sage, 1992b. 
Glazer, Nathan & Daniel P. Moynihan (eds.), Ethnicity. Theory and experi-
ence. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1975. 
Goldberg, David T., “Introduction. Multicultural conditions.” In: David 
Theo Goldberg (ed.), Multiculturalism. A critical reader, 1 - 44. Cam-
bridge, MA: Blackwell Publishers. 
Gutmannn, Amy, The challenge of multiculturalism in political ethics.' Phi-
losophy & Public Affairs 22: 171 – 206, 1993. 
Habermas, Jürgen, “Strijd om erkenning in een democratische rechtstaat.” 
In: Amy Gutmann (ed.), Multiculturalisme. De politiek van erkenning na-
der onderzocht, 129 - 171. Amsterdam: Boom, 1995. 
Handler, Richard, Nationalism and the politics of culture in Quebec. Madi-
son: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1988. 
Hannerz, Ulf, Cultural complexities. Studies in the social organisation of 
meaning. New York: Columbia University Press, 1992. 
Ibid., Transnational connections. Culture, people, places. London: 
Routledge, 1996. 
Hechter, Michael, Internal colonialism. The Celtic fringe in British national 
development, 1536 – 1966. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1975. 
 
  36 
 Ibid., “Response to Cohen. Max Weber on ethnicity and ethnic change.” 
American Journal of Sociology 81: 1162 – 1168, 1976. 
Hollinger, David, Postethnic America. Beyond multiculturalism. New 
York: Basic Books, 1995. 
Ibid., Toward to liberation of culture from color. Recent trends in the mul-
ticulturalism debate. Lecture held in Amsterdam, Spring 1997. 
Horowitz, Donald L., Etnnic groups in conflict. Berkeley: The University 
of California Press, 1985. 
Hymowitz, Kay S., “Self-esteem and multiculturalism in the public 
schools.” Dissent Winter: 23 – 29, 1992. 
Ingold, Tim, “The politics of culture in Finnish Lapland.” In: Hans Ver-
meulen & Jeremy Boissevain (eds.), Ethnic challenge. The politics of eth-
nicity in Europe, 66 – 83. Göttingen: Edition Herodot, 1984. 
Keesing, Roger M., “Theories of culture revisited.” In: Robert Borofsky 
(ed.), Assessing cultural anthropology, 301 – 310. New York: McGraw – 
Hill, Inc, 1994. 
Kymlicka, Will, Multicultural citizenship. A liberal theory of minority 
rights. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995. 
Ibid., “Introduction. An emerging consensus?” Ethical Theory and Moral 
Practice 1: 143 – 157, 1998. 
Lind, Michael, The next American nation. The new nationalism and the 
fourth American revolution. New York: The Free Press, 1995. 
Löfgren, Orvar, “On the anatomy of culture.” Ethnologia Europaea 12: 26 
– 46, 1981. 
Lopez, Mark, The origins of multiculturalism in Australian politics. 
Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Melbourne, 1997. 
 
  37Lucassen, Leo & André J.F. Köbben, Het partiële gelijk. Controverses over 
het onderwijs in de eigen taal en cultuur en de rol daarbij van beleid en we-
tenschap (1951 – 1991). Amsterdam: Swets & Zeitlinger, 1992. 
Margalit, Avishai & Moshe Halbertal, “Liberalism and the right to culture.” 
Social Research 61(3): 491 – 510, 1994. 
Ibid., “A response to Amélie Oksenberg Rorty.” Social Research 62(1): 
171 – 173, 1995. 
Margalit, Avishai & Joseph Raz, “National self-determination.” Journal of 
Philosophy 87(9): 439 – 461, 1990. 
Melleuish, Gregory, The packaging of Australia. Politics and culture wars. 
Sydney: University of New South Wales Press, 1998. 
Mill, John Stuart, On liberty and other writings. Cambridge texts in the his-
tory of political thought. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989. 
Musschenga, Albert W., “Intrinsic value as a reason for the preservation of 
minority cultures.” Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 1: 201 – 225, 1998. 
Nauta, Lolle, “Vreemdelingen. Afscheidscollege van Lolle Nauta op 31 
mei 1994.” Krisis 56: 5 – 15, 1994. 
Patterson, Orlando, “Context and choice in ethnic allegiance. A theoretical 
framework and Carribean case study.” In: Nathan Glazer & Daniel P. 
Moynihan (eds.), Etnicity. Theory and experience, 305 - 349. Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press, 1975. 
Porter, Judith and Robert E. Washington, “Black identity and self-esteem. 
A review of studies of black self-concept, 1968-1978.” Annual Review of 
Sociology 5: 53 – 74, 1979. 
Raz, Joseph, “Multiculturalism. A liberal perspective.” Dissent Winter: 67 
– 79, 1994. 
 
  38 
 Reitz, Jeffrey, The survival of ethnic groups. Toronto: McGraw - Hill Ry-
erson, 1980. 
Rockefeller, Steven C., “Comment.” In: Charles Taylor, Multiculturalism 
and the “politics of recognition”'. An essay, 87 - 98. Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1992. 
Roosens, Eugeen E., Creating ethnicity. The process of ethnogenesis. 
Newbury Park : Sage Publications, 1989. 
Ibid., “The primordial nature or origins in migrant ethnicity.” In: Hans Ver-
meulen & Cora Govers (eds.), The anthropology of ethnicity. Beyond 
“Ethnic groups and boundaries”', 81 - 101. Amsterdam: Het Spinhuis, 
1994. 
Roseberry, William, “Multiculturalism and the challenge of anthropology.” 
Social Research 59: 841 – 858, 1992. 
Schierup, Carl – Ulrik, “Multiculturalism, neo-racism and vicissitudes of 
contemporary democracy.” In: Jan Hjarnø (ed.), Multiculturalism in the 
Nordic societies, Proceedings of the 9th Nordic seminar for researchers on 
migration and ethnic relations. 10 - 29. Copenhagen: Tema Nord, 1995. 
Swaan, Abraham de, “Identificatie in uitdijende kring.” Amsterdams 
Sociologisch Tijdschrift 21: 6 – 24, 1994. 
Taguieff, Pierre-André, “From race to culture. The new right's view of 
European identity.” Telos 98/99: 99 – 126, 1993. 
Taylor, Charles, Multiculturalism and “the politics of recognition”. Prince-
ton,NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992. 
Ibid., “De politiek van erkenning.” In: Amy Gutmann (ed.), Multicultural-
isme. De politiek van erkenning nader onderzocht, 43 – 98. Amsterdam: 
Boom, 1995. 
 
  39Vayda, Andrew P., “Actions, variations and change. The emerging anti - 
essentialist view in anthropology.” In: Robert Borofsky (ed.), Assessing 
cultural anthropology, 320 - 329. New York: McGraw - Hill, Inc., 1994. 
Verdery, Katherine, “Ethnicity, nationalism and statemaking.” In: Hans 
Vermeulen & Cora Govers (eds.), The anthropology of ethnicity. Beyond 
“Ethnic groups and boundaries”, 33 - 58. Amsterdam: Het Spinhuis, 1994. 
Verkuyten, Maykel, Zelfbeleving van jeugdige allochtonen. Een socio - 
psychologische benaderingen. Amsterdam: Swetz & Zeitlinger, 1992. 
Vermeulen, Hans & Cora Govers, “From political mobilization to the poli-
tics of conscience.” In: Hans Vemeulen & Cora Govers (eds.), The politics 
of ethnic conscience, 1 - 30. Houndmills: MacMillan Press Ltd., 1997. 
Vermeulen, Hans, Etnische groepen en grenzen. Surinamers, Chinezen en 
Turken. Weesp: Het Wereldvenster, 1984. 
Ibid., “De cultura. Een verhandeling over het cultuurbegrip in de studie van 
allochtone etnische groepen.” Migrantenstudies 92(2): 14 – 30, 1992. 
Ibid., “Essentializing difference? The census, multiculturalism and the mul-
tiracials in the USA.” In: Marie-Claire Foblets & Pang C. Lin (red.), Cul-
tuur, etniciteit en migratie, 81 – 98. Leuven: Acco, 1999a. 
Ibid., „Immigration, integration and the politics of culture.” Netherlands 
Journal of Social Sciences 35: 6 – 22, 1999b. 
Vertovec, Stephen, “Multiculturalism, culturalism and public incorpora-
tion.” Ethnic and Racial Studies 19: 49 – 69, 1996. 
Wallerstein, Immanuel, “Globalisering of transitie? Een lange - ter-
mijnvisie op de ontwikkelingen van het wereldsysteem.“ Amsterdams So-
ciologisch Tijdschrift 26: 145 – 163, 1999. 
Waters, Mary C., Ethnic options. Choosing identities in America. Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1990. 
  40 
 Weber, Max, Economy and society. An outline of interpretative sociology. 
Volume I, edited by Günther Roth and Claus Dittrich. New York: Badmin-
ster Press, 1968. 
Weil, Patrick & John Crowley, “Integration in theory and practice. A com-
parison of France and Britain.” West European Politics 17(2): 110 – 126, 
1994. 
Wolf, Eric J., Europe and the people without history. Berkeley, CA: Uni-
versity of California Press, 1982.  
Ibid., “Ethnicity and nationhood.” Journal of Ethnic Studies 21: 27 – 32, 
1988. 
Wrong, Dennis H., “Cultural relativism as ideology.” Critical Review 
11(2): 291 – 300, 1997. 
Young, Iris Marion, Justice and the politics of difference. Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 1990. 
  41Ana Devic 
Nationalism, Regional Multiculturalism 
and Democracy in the Province of 
Vojvodina, Serbia’s “Multiethnic Haven” 
I. Main  Questions 
This paper addresses the issue of applicability of the theory and policies of 
liberal multiculturalism, as elaborated by its most prominent advocate, a 
Canadian political philosopher Will Kymlicka, in multiethnic spaces of the 
post-socialist Southeastern Europe. It focuses on a specific case of 
regionalism – as a form of identity and political movement – in the 
multiethnic northern Serbian province of Vojvodina, which has until today 
been spared of inter-ethnic violence that has characterized all other 
constitutive regions of the former socialist federative Yugoslavia. Based on 
a study of the development and activities of the Vojvodinian political 
parties and non-governmental organizations that have sought to wrest 
autonomy of the region vis-à-vis Serbia during both the reign of Slobodan 
Milosevic’s regime and in its aftermath since 2000, the following questions 
are being asked: What is the reason that, despite the steady and rising 
dissatisfaction with the socio-economic standing of the Province among the 
ordinary people, and the sentiments that manifest regional and multiethnic 
(or inter-ethnic) identities, Vojvodinian autonomist parties have failed to 
mobilize significant political support? Why do they seem to be 
continuously losing the battle with the Belgrade-based parties for the 
proclaimed goals of the new constitutional and budgetary autonomy of the 
Province, which includes greater regulation, and support of its ethnic 
  minority and multiethnic institutions? Finally, and most significantly: Is the 
model of liberal multiculturalism, as a scheme of combating particularistic 
ethnic nationalisms and chauvinisms applicable in an environment where a 
passage from the socialist, one-party system to a democratic and pluralist 
organization of polity and society has been paralleled by conflicts and 
violence organized along ethnic lines and geared to enforce ethnic 
divisions. In other words, can the theory and policies prescribed by liberal 
multiculturalism (much studied and praised in the region) offer a model for 
construction of democratic polities in multiethnic spaces of the post-
Communist East-Central Europe?  
The following section of the paper will briefly outline the main argument 
of liberal multiculturalism and its uses for understanding the break-up and 
reconstruction of multi- and inter-ethic experiences in the former 
Yugoslavia, as well as local prospects for democratization. It will also put 
in the question the applicability of liberal multiculturalism to the issues of 
cultural identity and political organization of immigrants in the states of the 
European Union. 
Following the section on theoretical schemes, I will present a brief 
overview of the position of Vojvodina in the federal Yugoslavia and its 
social and cultural decline after the abolition of its constitutional autonomy 
in 1988. In the fourth part I will draw a map of political programs and 
activities of the local autonomist parties. The fifth section will focus on the 
non-governmental organizations, depicting their role in researching and 
framing the grievances, identities and solidarities of ordinary Vojvodinians 
in terms of evaluation of the prospects for local democratic development. 
Before the concluding section, I will outline some newest political 
developments that, in the aftermath of the 2000 elections, reveal the 
patterns of intense fights between the members of the Serbian coalition, 
where the goals of Vojvodinian autonomy and multiethnic identity may be 
reframed in terms of ethnic divisions and a scramble for sinecures. 
Here I will demonstrate that the Vojvodinian autonomist elites’ political 
strategy has consisted primarily of the deal-making with Serbian Belgrade-
based parties, where the polity access has favored the choice of horse 
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minority party leaderships. Simultaneously, they have been discouraged to 
organize large support in their locales. The goals of democracy, understood 
in this context as raising opportunities for broad political participation and 
advancement of regional ethnic and multiethnic practices, are thus being 
continuously preempted. 
II. Theoretical  considerations 
Liberal multiculturalism, as a theory of ethnic and cultural identities and 
their links to political institutions, which has been developed most 
elaborately by the Canadian political philosopher Will Kymlicka,
1 
postulates that ethnic identity is the main source of cultural self-
identification and the principal form of political mobilization in democratic 
and multiethnic liberal states. Ethnic identity is the main basis for political 
solidarity (and, subsequently, the most tenacious political grievance) and 
must be therefore recognized, i.e. institutionalized on all levels of 
government: grouping along ethnic-cultural lines, thus, creates something 
akin to territorially concentrated interest groups. Curiously, although the 
concept of a benevolent democratic state that grants such privileges to 
ethnic groups is quite central to such multicultural society, the political 
foundations and development of such state are considered as given facts. In 
Kymlicka’s works, we are never given an answer to the question, how the 
ethos of such multicultural state is instituted in historical practice, and 
brought to be able to equally politicize all cultural-ethnic identities on its 
territory. The connection between the links of ethnic minorities to that state 
is never compared to the links that ethnic majorities have to the state. In 
other words, this benevolent state appears to be the endowment of ethnic 
majority culture that recognizes “others” on its territory and elevates them 
 
1  Will Kymlicka, Politics in the Vernacular: Nationalism, Multiculturalism and Citi-
zenship (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001). See especially chapters on “Lib-
eral Multiculturalism: An Emerging Consensus?” (Pp. 39-47); “From Enlighten-
ment Cosmopolitanism to Liberal Nationalism” (pp. 203-220); and “Misunderstand-
ing Nationalism“ (pp. 242-253). 
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 to the status equal or similar to its own. The neglect of the issues of 
nationalism as an ideology of state-building, and accompanying power 
relations is quite striking in Kymlicka’s sparsely elaborated views on the 
modern history of the United States and other Western states, where he 
acknowledges that political elites had forged their democratic polities by 
imposing the “White Anglo-Saxon”, “French”, “German”, or “British” 
culture on a variety of linguistically and culturally diverse populations. 
Kymlicka, however, does not suppose that the current state of liberal 
multiculturalism in these countries must be elaborated in relation to such 
foundational developments. The only explanation for their contemporary 
existence as liberal multicultural states he finds in the fact that ethnic 
minorities in these states had been able to press their cultural grievances to 
the point that they were recognized and institutionalized – due to the fact 
that democratic institutions have progressed over time to a desirable level. 
The circularity of the argument here is due to the lack of transparency of 
the role of state-building nationalism in modern Western societies. It 
becomes even more pervasive when we ask the question: what is the 
binding ‘glue’ of such multicultural states, if ethnic identities are to be 
considered as the main force of political mobilization. There, Kymlicka 
simply asserts that the population of a liberal democratic state (and we are 
terribly tempted to read this as “majority”) somehow tolerates the fact that 
ethnic groups (“minorities”) would have the right to secede and form ‘their 
own’ states if they wished to do so.  
Still rare, albeit rigorous critics of Kymlicka, coming from the field of 
political sociology, have observed that the only significant effort that 
Kymlicka puts in providing alternatives to the dangers of majority, and 
especially minority nationalisms, is that he transports nationalism to sub-
state levels, while discarding the potentials for primacy of non-ethnic 
identities in either everyday life or political mobilization. An elaborated 
criticism in this direction is presented in the work of Hans Vermeulen and 
Boris Slijper, who show the weaknesses of the philosophy of 
multiculturalism at its very premises, i.e. in its understanding of the 
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national and political interests, on the other.
2 In their rigorous assessment 
of the nature of cultural diversity in globalized, especially Western 
societies, Vermeulen and Slijper point to the problems of a culturalist 
assessment of culture and ethnicity (to which multiculturalist philosophy 
belongs), which perceives both as “autonomous fields”, “independent from 
political or economic structures”. The authors show that such culturalist 
perceptions of culture and ethnicity had been prominent since the XIX 
century in the mainstream social science and humanities, and were tied to 
the ideology of nation-state formation. In this context, the idea of a 
culturally homogeneous society paralleled the interests of political and 
cultural elites who strove to forge a unifying set of cultural traits (ethnicity, 
language, religion) that had allegedly formed the basis of national-state 
allegiance. The idea of a pre- or meta-societal cultural homogeneity of a 
group of people who could be called citizens of one state assumed a special 
affinity with some crucial aspects of the democratic ideal, i.e. the given 
equality of human individuals. 
Contemporary forms of liberal multiculturalism, as Vermeulen and Slijper 
argue, along with Dennis Wrong and Michaels Billig,
3 transport the same 
perceptions of the political relevance of cultural and ethnic homogeneity to 
sub-state levels. While arguing that ethnic majority nationalisms are wrong 
because they oppress minorities, liberal multiculturalists prescribe a variety 
of minority nationalisms that would serve as the best remedy against the 
majority nationalism, and would provide the primary basis for democratic 
organizing of citizens. In this way, they deny opportunities to citizens, 
especially those of ethnic minority backgrounds, to politically organize in 
pursuit of democracy around non-ethnic issues – that are available to 
members of ethnic majority only (or non-immigrant population)! Using 
 
2  Hans Vermeulen and Boris Slijper, “Multiculturalism and Culturalism: A Social 
Scientific Critique of the Political Philosophy of Multiculturalism,“ Paper presented 
at the Second EuroConference Democracy Beyond the Nation-State: Perspectives 
on a post-National Order, 5-7 October 2000, Athens. 
3  Dennis H. Wrong, “Cultural Relativism as Ideology,” Critical Review, Vol. 11, No. 
2, 1997; Michael Billig, Banal Nationalism (London: Sage, 1995). 
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 examples from the immigrant societies of Western Europe, Vermeulen and 
Slijper show that immigrants, even those from countries geographically 
distant from Europe, show a great deal of internal cultural and social 
diversity, as well as an increasing propensity for cultural and political 
identification with their “new homes”. Subsequently, their ability and 
interest in engaging in democratic process may be limited more by concrete 
restrictive immigrant policies than by the alleged internal ethnic or 
religious homogeneity.  
There are, thus, two main problems with liberal multiculturalism that bear 
relevance to both Western industrialized (immigrant) societies and 
multiethnic post-socialist “transitional” states. One is the identification of 
ethnic identity with all culture, or prioritization of ethnicity above all 
cultural traits, and the other is the assumption that such ethnicisized culture 
is the primary basis for political organizing of ethnic minorities in the 
context of democratic societies. In the context of post-socialist states of 
East-Central and Southeastern Europe, these erroneous premises come into 
a state of dangerous affinity with the interests of nationalist elites who, 
during the past decade, strove to re-draw states boundaries, and justified 
their agendas with claims of providing political defense to ethnically 
homogeneous communities. In the context of the post-socialist societies, 
characterized with ”democratic deficit”, identification of ethnicity with all 
cultural life and with the paramount political interest serves to deny both 
the reality of inter-ethnic lifestyles and prospects for alternative or 
oppositional political grouping. These problems have become more visible 
in the most recent attempt of the leading liberal multiculturalist to defend 
the model in a broader, non-Western, context. 
In his most recently edited volume, to which he contributed two lengthy 
chapters, Will Kymlicka addresses the issue of applicability of liberal 
multiculturalism to the post-Communist states of East-Central Europe.
4 
 
4  Will Kymlicka and Magda Opalski, eds., Can Liberal Pluralism be Exported? West-
ern Political Theory and Ethnic Relations in Eastern Europe (Oxford: Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 2002). See chapters “Western Political Theory and Ethnic Relations 
in Eastern Europe” (pp. 13-105), and “Reply and Conclusions” (pp. 347-413). 
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create pseudo-federalist systems where communist parties circumvent free 
politicization of ethnic identities, he does not consider that some other 
reasons apart, if not above, ethnic grievances could have formed the hopes 
for democratic transition in these countries. Assuming that the prevention 
of free ethnic homogenization around political institutions was the basis of 
mass discontent in the former communist states, Kymlicka contends that 
the main test for liberalization-democratization of this region remains their 
correct management of ethnic relations. Not surprisingly, the reasons for 
these states not to manage their ethnicities will remain only a matter of 
“learning”: 
Most ECE states with minority nationalisms have the shell of liberal 
democracy, but remain afraid of the full and free exercise of democratic 
freedoms.
5 
While the passage from a pseudo-federalism to a “normal” one may be 
painful, the latter remains the best form of accommodating “minorities”, 
which are, just like in his treatment of ethnic politics in the West, defined 
as recipients of rights from a benevolent state (that belongs to the 
“majority”). In a single sentence, Kymlicka nevertheless mentions the 
possibility of non-territorial accommodation of ethnic rights, namely the 
conception of “cultural autonomy” formulated by Otto Bauer and other 
Austro-Marxists at the turn of the twentieth century, and referring to it as 
“an interesting supplement” to Western models of minority rights.
6 While 
one could expect that here Kymlicka would question the assumption of the 
supposedly “given integration” or “neat fit” of territorially homogenized 
nations of the West, he merely acknowledges that in East-Central Europe 
“nations” (which are not analytically distinguished from “ethnicities” 
except when he speaks of immigrants) in many areas are more dispersed 
than in the West.  
 
5  Will Kymlicka, Politics in the Vernacular: Nationalism, Multiculturalism and Citi-
zenship, Oxford University Press, 2001, p. 369. 
6  Ibid., p. 68. 
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 The collapse of federal Yugoslavia through inter-ethnic wars is defined by 
Kymlicka as a struggle of disgruntled ethnicities against the “pseudo-
federal” state, whose non-democratic polity only aggravated what could 
have been ‘normal’ ethnic claims for territorial autonomies. In his depiction 
of the political life in Bosnia-Herzegovina or Croatia we get no glimpse of 
the ways in which inter-ethnic relations worked on the ground, in everyday 
life, where supposedly discontents would have been simmering. Instead, by 
relying on an account of the Yugoslav wars by a Belgrade journalist, 
Kymlicka argues that Slobodan Milosevic, Franjo Tudjman and Alija 
Izetbegovic were illiberal (lacking democratic accountability) nationalists 
who sought to form unitary (Serb, Croat, Bosniak) states, thereby satisfying 
the grievances of their respective nations alone
7. To argue that the main 
problem of Bosnian political elites (in three nationalist parties) in 1992 was 
their insensitivity to “minority claims”, not only displays the ignorance of 
the fact that in the pre-1992 Bosnia-Herzegovina, all three nationalities 
were constitutionally recognized as “titular nations”, but it also shows the 
lack of awareness of the densely interethnic cultures that characterized 
most of the former Yugoslavia (and especially Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
Croatia, and Vojvodina), and a range of non-ethnic grievances that were 
captured by social scientists in all former Yugoslav republics prior to the 
outbreak of violence.
8 
And here we arrive at the point where liberal multiculturalism-nationalism 
starts making little sense: when trying to use the model for understanding 
the causality between the breakdown of former federal states through 
violence, and forms of inter-ethnic everyday life and main grievances of 
the population prior to the collapse of Communism and the first multi-party 
 
7  Ibid., p. 92. 
8  See Nikola Dugandzija, Croatia Society on the Eve of Transition (Zagreb: Institute 
for Social Research, 1993); Group of authors, Jugoslavija na kriznoj prekretnici 
Yugoslavia at a Crisis Turning Point (Beograd: Centar za politikoloska istrazivanja 
i javno mnjenje, 1991); Neven Andjelic: The Evolution of the Civil Society in a pre 
– War Bosnia-Herzegovina, in Stefano Bianchini and George Schöpflin, eds., State 
Building in the Balkans. Dilemmas on the Eve of the 21
st Century (Ravenna: 
Longo, 1998). 
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inter-ethnic violence had taken place (and where, subsequently, one could 
argue, ethnic grievances were mostly suppressed and waiting to be 
“resolved”) show, the principal discontents of the population, both prior 
and after the end of the one-party rule, as well as after the fall of 
Milosevic’s regime, have been experienced as locale- and region-centered 
(not mono-ethnic) socio-economic problems, and concerns about the 
deterioration of inter-ethnic relations due to ethnonationalism. Here, the 
insistence on the application of liberal multiculturalism-nationalism in the 
form of prescribing ethnic institutions as the basis of a broader inclusion of 
the population in democratic processes is misleading. I will offer some 
additional Vojvodina-specific criticism and partial usefulness of the model 
in the last section of the paper. 
III.  Overview: Vojvodina, The Neglected “Multiethnic 
Haven”  
In all of the former Yugoslavia, the initial staging of ethno-nationalist 
mobilization, which the faction of Slobodan Milosevic pursued in the form 
of a coup in the Serbian League of Communists in 1987, had a 
bandwagoning effect on the political machineries in the rest of the 
republics. This momentum was aggravated by the de-concentrated system 
of one-party oligarchic rule that, following the demise of the self-
management socialist system, would be legitimized solely by the republics’ 
“titular nationalities”. Most importantly, the complete lack of access to 
polity, which had characterized the majority of ordinary people in the 
country for over forty years, had dragged them to lend support, if only 
passive and resting on insecurity and fears, to “their” nationalist parties. 
This was the process through which former Yugoslavs and civic persons 
became “vocational” Serbs, Croats, Bosniaks, et al. Where few considered 
themselves before as “minorities” or “majorities”, now that was the only 
status they could strive for or fall victim to.  
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 The most ethnically diverse constitutive region of the former socialist 
Yugoslavia,
9 and the most economically developed part of the Later 
Serbian-Montenegrin federation, Vojvodina was the arena of the first 
violation of the constitutional autonomy of Serbia’s provinces (Kosovo 
being the second) by Slobodan Milosevic’s faction of the Serbian League 
of Communists in 1988. Since the first multiparty elections in 1990, the 
Province of Vojvodina has differed from Kosovo and the rest of ex-
Yugoslav regions in staging its resistance to the Belgrade regime in the 
form of simultaneously seeking the restoration of its institutional support 
for linguistic and cultural diversity, and its political and economic self-rule. 
This programmatic stance is characteristic, with some variations in 
priorities, for both multiethnic and mono-ethnic minority political parties in 
Vojvodina: most local political actors have identified the goals of 
democratization and stability with some form of the Province’s autonomy 
within Serbia and FR Yugoslavia. 
Despite the fact that it was the first territory of the socialist federal 
Yugoslavia to have its constitutional autonomy abolished, as part of 
Slobodan Milosevic’s advent to power in 1987-89, the efforts of regional 
political actors in the Province of Vojvodina, as mentioned previously, 
have been largely and until recently neglected by Western scholars and 
international power-brokers. One common-sense reason for this lack of 
interest may be the fact that it was spared from inter-ethnic violence despite 
 
9  National Composition of Serbia and Vojvodina in 1991 in percentages 
Serbia (total)    Serbia proper    Vojvodina   
Serbs 66  Serbs 87  Serbs  57 
Albanians 17  Muslims  2.5  Hungarians  17 
Yugoslavs 3  Yugoslavs 2.5  Yugoslavs  8.4 
Muslims 2  Albanians  N/a Croats  4.8 
Croats 1  Montenegrins 1.4  Slovaks  3.2 
Montenegrins 1     Montenegrins  2.2 
Macedonians 0.4     Rumanians  1.9 
Slovenes 0.1      Ruthenians  0.9 
      Macedonians  0.8 
Other 8  Other 10  Other  3.5 
       Source: Yugoslav Survey, No. 1 (1992). 
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left to study for more peaceful times. The misfortunate outcome of such 
“boxed” status of Vojvodina was that it was considered as a “safe haven”, a 
“model of multiethnic coexistence”, but – because it was still part of the 
“troubled region” – it was not included, just like most of the successor 
states of former Yugoslavia, in the studies of post-socialist 
democratization. More concerted international efforts to assist the regional 
parties and non-governmental organizations in Vojvodina became visible 
only in late 1998, prompted by the planning of the military intervention in 
Kosovo, and the subsequent greater interest of international actors in 
pooling together the anti-Milosevic parties and anti-nationalist civic 
groups.  
Until the fall of Milosevic’s regime in October 2000, Vojvodinian 
regionalist and anti-nationalist actors (especially non-governmental 
organizations which grew out of the anti-war protests of 1991-1992) had 
reasons to believe that the greater international interest and assistance to 
local initiatives would also continue beyond the goal of dethroning 
Milosevic, and extend to supporting programs of the restoration of 
autonomy to the Province’s assembly, economy and multiethnic cultural 
institutions. Hopes grew high, especially after the inauguration of the Pact 
for Stability in Southeastern Europe in 1999, a European Union initiative 
that supported regional projects ranging from infrastructure rebuilding to 
laws on minority rights. Montenegro, as a democracy-bound breakaway 
from the rump Yugoslavia, was admitted to the Pact’s program in a special 
capacity. Many experts and non-governmental activists in Vojvodina 
believed at the time that Vojvodina could join, too, as a province with 
special regional needs. Much of the efforts vested by Vojvodinian experts 
in preparing project proposals for joining the Stability Pact had to be 
forgotten after October 2000, since, as it was actually clear from the Pact’s 
rules, only individual states could become its partners.  
A structured analysis of political processes in Vojvodina as part of the 
analysis of the rise and (future) fall of ethno-nationalism in Serbia and FR 
Yugoslavia is still in its naissance. The following sections will chart a map 
of partisan and civic actors that should inform such analysis. 
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 IV.  Regionalist Political Parties 
The setback in the economic, political and cultural autonomy of the 
Province of Vojvodina, manifested in the abolition of its previously 
independent judicial, legislative and executive bodies in 1988-90, and 
coinciding with the introduction of a multi-party system, gave impetus to 
the emergence of several ‘autonomist’ Vojvodinian parties. They drew 
their leadership from the vast numbers of Vojvodinian political and cultural 
elites that were either directly dismissed or marginalized in the aftermath of 
the 1988 putsch by Slobodan Milosevic’s faction in the Serbian League of 
Communists.  
In the programs of all three largest Vojvodina-based parties – the Reformist 
Democratic Party of Vojvodina, the League of Social Democrats of 
Vojvodina, and the Alliance of Vojvodinian Hungarians – the period from 
1968 to 1988, during which Vojvodina had enjoyed a status nearly identical 
to that of federal republics is distinguished from the subsequent period 
(which largely coincides with the introduction of a multi-party system) in 
which most of Vojvodina’s prerogatives of autonomy were abolished. In 
the programs of all three parties, this demarcation line plays a point of 
departure for the elaboration of negative consequences of the political 
centralization in Serbia under Milosevic. While the main theme of the party 
program of the Alliance of Vojvodinian Hungarians, the strongest ethnic 
party not only in Vojvodina but in Serbia as well, is cultural and 
administrative autonomy of Hungarians in Vojvodina,
10 the Alliance shares 
 
 
10  The program of the Alliance of Vojvodinian Hungarians has envisaged a combina-
tion of personal (cultural) and territorial autonomy. The Alliance’s leadership has 
customarily switched between the two options during their electoral campaigns, and 
especially in their dealings with the strongest Serbian parties. Personal autonomy 
would extend to all Vojvodinian Hungarians, regardless of party allegiance or resi-
dence, who would be organized in National Councils in charge of the restoration 
and maintenance of Hungarian cultural and media institutions. On occasions, terri-
torial autonomy has been demanded for northern Backa, a region in Vojvodina bor-
dering Hungary, in which Hungarians form majority in eight municipalities. The 
Democratic Community of Vojvodinian Hungarians, a party that captured the ma-
jority of Hungarian votes in Vojvodina in 1990-1992, but became marginalized in 
the following period, has initially elaborated this multi-layered model of autonomy. 
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Vojvodina (by the Belgrade-based institutions) with the Reformist Party 
and the League of Social Democrats. All party programs point to the 
relative wealth of the Province in comparison to Serbia proper, which 
stands in dramatic contrast to the rampant unemployment and growing 
poverty. The following effects of the 1988-1990 abolition of the 
governmental and legislative autonomy of Vojvodina are emphasized in the 
autonomist parties’ programs: the loss of control over agricultural surpluses 
(the main source of the Province’s income); the loss of managerial 
autonomy over all industrial complexes in Vojvodina (such as two major 
oil refineries in Novi Sad and Pancevo and the system of field irrigation); 
the elimination of Vojvodinian autonomous budgetary institutions and the 
office of tax revenues; and the closing of the Novi Sad Radio-Television 
station, which became a local branch of Radio-TV Serbia. The abolition of 
the formerly autonomous Vojvodinian media centers, in combination with 
the elimination of the previously rich budgetary donations to multilingual 
educational curricula (until 1990, they were allocated directly from the 
Vojvodinian budget) have significantly contributed to the decline of the 
Province’s multiethnic and inter-ethnic cultural and academic scene. 
Additional foci of concern of the Vojvodinian political parties include the 
relationship between the economic and cultural weakening of Vojvodina 
and dramatic migration trends, which affected the Province after the 
beginning of the wars in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1991-1992: 
since Vojvodina was targeted by the military draft to a much greater extent 
than other areas in Serbia, large numbers of young Vojvodinian Hungarians 
and draft-dodging Serbs had left the country (from the total of close to 
90,000 draft dodgers who left the Province since 1991, over 50,000 were 
Vojvodinian Hungarians). Simultaneously, close to 300,000 Serb refugees 
and displaced persons from Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina had settled in 
Vojvodina between 1991 and 1997. 
 
Territorial autonomy would leave close to two fifths of Vojvodinian Hungarians 
without the same rights to education and information in their mother tongue that 
their co-ethnics in the north of Vojvodina would enjoy. 
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 In view of these facts documenting economic decline and cultural changes 
in Vojvodina, and their apparently direct link to the abolition of the 
Province’s prerogatives of autonomy, it seems striking that Vojvodinian 
autonomist parties attracted a minuscule following between 1990 and 1997. 
During this period, the Socialist Party of Serbia and Serb Radical Party 
could count on the average support of fifty per cent of those who voted in 
Vojvodina. The following data depict electoral preferences of Vojvodinians 
during the republican elections in 1992 and 1997. 
1992 Elections for Deputies in the Serbian Parliament (Results for Vojvodina)
11  
Political party  Percentage of votes  Percentage of Vojvodinian 
mandates 
Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS)  23  30 
Serb Radical Party  23  30 
Democratic Community of Vojvodinian 
Hungarians 
11 16 
Coalition DEPOS (Belgrade-based anti-
Milosevic parties) 
15 19 
Coalition of Democratic Party and Reformist 
Democratic Party of Vojvodina 
5.7 3.6 
1997 Elections for Deputies in the Serbian Parliament (Results for Vojvodina)
12 
Political party  Percentage of votes  Percentage of Vojvodinian 
mandates 
Serb Radical Party  29  38 
Coalition of SPS, Yugoslav Party of Left, 
and New Democracy 
28 40 
Serb Renewal Party  9.7  7 
Alliance of Vojvodinian Hungarians  5  7 
Coalition of Vojvodinian autonomist parties   11  7 
It would be tempting to interpret these electoral results as a manifestation 
 
11  Seventy nine per cent of the population voted. From Miroslav Samardzic, Polozaj 
manjina u Vojvodini The Status of Minorities in Vojvodina (Belgrade: Centar za an-
tiratnu akciju, 1998, p. 134). 
12  Sixty two per cent of the population voted. Ibid., p.138. 
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case, the after-shocks of the expulsion of Croatian Serbs, who have flocked 
to the Province in the aftermath of the 1995 Croatian Army re-occupation 
of the territories which Serbs had carved in the newly independent state of 
Croatia in 1991-1992. However, this explanation would miss the facts of 
the increasing voters’ abstinence, the continuous rivalries between the party 
leaders of the two main multiethnic autonomist parties at the expense of the 
choice of building stable coalitions, the periodic granting of parliamentary 
sinecures to the leaders of the main Hungarian party by the regime, and an 
exemplary organization of electoral campaigns of the ultra-nationalist 
Radical Party, during which it successfully played down its paramilitary 
activities in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina and voiced its dedication to 
protecting Vojvodina against the potential spread of violence from the 
neighboring regions.  
It seemed that the situation had changed dramatically during the 2000 
presidential and local elections, when close to sixty per cent of the 
Vojvodinian electorate voted for the coalition Democratic Opposition of 
Serbia  (which both the Hungarian Alliance and the two multiethnic 
Vojvodina parties joined) and its candidate Vojislav Kostunica, while the 
percentage of those who went to the polls grew from sixty per cent in 1997 
to over seventy in 2000. However, it is safe to argue that, similar to the 
situation in Serbia proper, these votes were cast primarily against Slobodan 
Milosevic’s party and its allies, and it is less likely that they expressed 
allegiance to any of the Vojvodinian parties in particular (with the partial 
exception of the Hungarian Alliance, which ran alone in the local elections 
in several towns in the Northern Backa). In reality, over almost a decade 
the lack of significant following has been a characteristic of both 
multiethnic and Hungarian political parties. Voters’ abstinence has been 
striking and growing over the past decade among the Hungarian and Serb 
populations (the two largest nationalities) alike. In contrast to Kosovo 
Albanians, who reacted to the oppression by the Serbian regime with an 
increased homogenization around one ethnic party, the Vojvodinian 
Hungarian vote was fractured as the initially strong Democratic Alliance of 
Vojvodinian Hungarians split in 1993 into two parties, and then was split 
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 again in 1996.
13 The splits, which until now produced six Hungarian 
parties, were accompanied by the increase in Hungarian voters’ abstinence.
  
One would hope that the overwhelming electoral defeat of the Socialist 
Party and Serbian Radical Party in the 2000 elections, in combination with 
awareness of the growing autonomist sentiment of the Vojvodinian hitherto 
passive electorate, would lead Vojvodinian autonomist parties to realize 
that the main reason for their fledgling popularity is not to be sought in 
their potential constituencies’ infatuation with ethnonationalist ideology. In 
other words, it could be expected that in the future Vojvodinian parties 
would face their unsuccessful mobilizational capacity, and would address 
the fact that their potential voters have been unable to relate their everyday-
life grievances to their local parties’ programs and behavior – fearful of 
building coalitions, and prone to a culturalist idealizing of the socialist past 
of the Province.  
The first steps that the Vojvodinian autonomist parties took in the aftermath 
of the 2000 elections indicated some degree of readiness to stick to their 
joint proposal for the re-instatement of the Vojvodinian autonomy. The 
Platform on the Constitutional Position of Vojvodina, which was passed in 
the Vojvodinian Assembly in April 2001 and submitted to the Serbian 
assembly (a somewhat ironic move, as the prerogatives of the Vojvodinian 
assembly vis-à-vis Serbia in the meantime were not reinstated even to the 
level they had in 1989-1990),
14 proposed the following consecutive steps in 
reinstating the autonomy of the Province: 1) The abolition of over 100 laws 
that were passed in the Serbian Parliament between 1992 and 1996, which 
destroyed even those remnants of the Province’s autonomy that were 
retained in the 1990 Constitution of Serbia; 2) Pressuring political parties in 
the Serbian and federal parliaments to start re-writing the Constitution of 
FR Yugoslavia with the emphasis on an asymmetric decentralization of 
 
13  See Zoran Lutovac, “Ucesce manjina u politickom zivotu SRJ“ Participation of Mi-
norities in the Political Life of the FR Yugoslavia, Republika, Nos. 167-168, July 
1997. 
  57political and economic control.
15 The Vojvodinian political parties 
envisioned that, following a successful implementation of these two sets of 
changes, the newly empowered legislative and executive bodies of the 
Province would exert further pressure on the Serbian and federal 
parliaments toward the institutionalization of a ‘special autonomy’ status of 
Vojvodina. 
Further details pertaining to dynamics of the positioning of Vojvodinian 
actors vis-à-vis the Belgrade-based parties will be presented in the section 
depicting the most recent developments in the Province. Let us now turn to 
Vojvodinian non-governmental organizations, i.e. the arena of civil society 
activities. 
V.  Non-Governmental Organizations: Studies in 
Regional Discontent, Identities and Solidarities 
As was previously noted, the Vojvodinian non-governmental scene was 
given a boost in late 1998, in the form of interest and financial assistance of 
international donors pursuing the goal of deposing Slobodan Milosevic, 
where one of the standard means was the ‘revival of civil society.’ The 
multiethnic map of Vojvodina, as well as its apparent resistance to inter-
ethic violence was now perceived as a suitable ground for cultivating 
agents of the prospective democratic change. A number of local 
intellectuals’ forums, composed of the cultural and political elites 
dismissed during Milosevic’s coup in 1988, newer recruits from the 
numerous pool of draft-dodgers of the 1991-1992 war with Croatia, and 
former anti-war activists, many of whom grew disillusioned with the 
Vojvodinian autonomist parties, assembled in the leadership and managers 
of the new NGOs, dedicated to Vojvodinian autonomy (or its incorporation 
 
14  All Vojvodinian political parties and other Belgrade-based parties of the Democ-
ratic Opposition of Serbia, with the notable exception of Vojislav Kostunica’s De-
mocratic Party of Serbia, voted for the Platform. 
15  Milena Putnik, “Srbiji predstoje ustavne promene: Obnavljanje Vojvodine“ Serbia 
is facing Constitutional Reforms: The Rebirth of Vojvodina, AIM, April 26, 2001. 
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 in the broader currents of Euro-regionalization), and the restoration of the 
local minority and multiethnic cultural scene. In the past four years, their 
major contributions to the growth of the Vojvodinian civil space have been 
threefold: 1) carrying out and publicizing projects on the local population’s 
grievances and identities; 2) monitoring and politicizing the problems of 
ethnic minorities; and 3) organizing local legal and political scientists as 
expert advisors to Vojvodinian and Serbian MPs whose agendas include 
the constitutional reform of FR Yugoslavia and autonomy for Vojvodina. 
Activities of three Vojvodinian NGOs, which I will present below, serve as 
examples of these three directions of improvement and politicization of the 
local civil society scene.  
The Novi Sad-based Center for Regionalism, founded in 1998 with a grant 
from the US Agency for Development (USAID), is a think-tank whose 
initial task was to assist Vojvodinian anti-regime economists, social 
scientists and lawyers in their efforts to establish links with various 
regional associations in Southeastern Europe. Until the demise of Slobodan 
Milosevic’s regime in 2000, the Center had organized several workshops 
on the prospects of economic and diplomatic cooperation between the 
Dayton Triangle states (which include FR Yugoslavia, Croatia and Bosnia-
Herzegovina). In the course of 1999 and 2000, the Center collaborated with 
several Croatian and Bosnian NGOs in preparing joint proposals for 
introducing dual citizenship laws and monitoring the safe return of 
refugees across the borders of the formerly warring states. 
Since 1999, the Center for Regionalism has engaged in commissioning 
proposals for constitutional reform of the FR Yugoslavia with an emphasis 
on the new autonomy for Vojvodina. The result was a study titled 
“Constitutional and Legal Framework for Decentralization of Serbia and 
Autonomy of Vojvodina”, which was subsequently submitted to 
functionaries of the Vojvodinian autonomist parties as an aid in their 
drafting of the proposal for the reinstatement of Vojvodina’s political and 
economic liberties. The latter proposal was submitted to the Serbian 
  59parliament in April 2001. The Center for Regionalism subsequently sent an 
abbreviated version of the study directly to the Republican Parliament.
 16  
In the aftermath of the 2000 elections, the Center for Regionalism has 
developed a more aggressive publicity scheme for popularizing the project, 
which included media broadcasts of the experts’ meetings in all urban 
areas in Vojvodina. The ‘Constitutional and Legal Framework for the 
Decentralization of Serbia’ proposes that the state should be organized as a 
“regionalized state community”, where each region would have the right to 
its own constitution, parliament and executive organs. An alternative 
proposal emphasizes that the future re-constitution of Serbia and FR 
Yugoslavia must occur in response to bottom-up pressures coming from 
individual regions themselves. It argues that Vojvodinian claims to 
autonomy must be given priority attention by the Serbian parliament and 
the 2000 winning coalition, since not all Serbian regions may be interested 
in equal degrees and forms of autonomy. It also states that in the case that 
the Serbian Parliament would reject the general plan for regionalization 
(or, if other regions in Serbia would not support this initiative), Vojvodina 
must be guaranteed a special status of ‘an autonomous European region,’ 
with its own constitution, parliament, local self-rule, and a possibility of 
creating sub-regions within Vojvodina, which would reflect the special 
economic and ethno-cultural configuration of the Province. 
These endeavors of the Center for Regionalism to push for a constitutional 
reform in favor of the Vojvodinian autonomy present an action on the part 
of local NGOs to complement and correct the Vojvodinian parties’ 
programs for autonomy with a combination of expert knowledge on the 
detrimental effects of the centralized rule in Serbia. They have also 
contributed, through their publicity agenda, to the popularization of the 
proposals for Vojvodinian autonomy in various public settings.  
 
16  The digested version of the study was published in the Belgrade daily Danas, which 
became the mouthpiece of the Serbian oppositional scene prior to their October 
2000 victory. See “Ustavno-pravni okvir decentralizacije Srbije i autonomije Vo-
jvodine“ The Constitutional-Legal Framework of the Decentralization of Serbia and 
Autonomy of Vojvodina, Danas, March 25-26, 27, and 30, 2000. 
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 The Center For Multiculturalism (CMC), which was founded in Novi Sad 
in 1998 with a grant of the Open Society Fund, is the most literary and 
academic NGO in Vojvodina. It focuses on the exploration of 
multiculturalism, mostly understood as monitoring and promotion of issues 
of minority politics. CMC has organized summer courses in Hungarian, 
Rumanian and Slovak languages in several Vojvodinian cities, with the 
goal of exposing majority linguistic groups (Serbs and Croats) to the 
practices of multilingualism, which had been dying out in Vojvodina since 
the end of WWII. Special attention is being paid to problems of the local 
ethnic communities, particularly those aspects of their life that were made 
invisible by both the repressive language policies and discrimination in the 
appointment of local officials during Milosevic’s era. In cooperation with 
the policy-oriented experts of the Center for Regionalism, CMC has 
organized several workshops on the comparative problems of minority 
politics in the post-Communist region. CMC publishes two periodicals: a 
newsletter  Informator, which focuses on institutional problems of the 
Vojvodinian minorities and records all local events pertaining to minority 
organization;  and Habitus, an academic journal (published also on the 
Internet in six Vojvodinian languages plus English and German), which 
publishes articles and discussions on liberal multiculturalism and its 
possible uses in the post-communist countries. Habitus intends to 
encourage cooperation between academics and practitioners from 
Southeastern Europe interested in the ideas and policies of 
multiculturalism. 
It should be noted that several authors from East-Central Europe who 
contributed to the earlier cited volume Can Liberal Pluralism be Exported? 
Western Political Theory and Ethnic Relations in Eastern Europe had 
previously published their essays in Habitus. Among them is Tibor Varady, 
a Vojvodinian law professor and a minister of justice in the short-lived 
1992 cabinet of the Serbian prime minister Milan Panic. Varady argues that 
the institutional arrangement of ethnic pluralism in the former socialist 
Yugoslavia bore many similarities to the situation in Canada, Switzerland 
and Finland. In contrast to the theses about the suppression of ethnic 
identities during socialism, Varady shows that ethno-pluralism had not only 
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also had its parallels and relative autonomy in the culture of everyday life, 
which became increasingly vulnerable once the socialist system of 
collective security had started falling apart. Varady suggests that Will 
Kymlicka’s normative proposals for the management of ethnic relations 
could be adopted in Vojvodina to the extent that educational and cultural 
institutions in minority languages, as well as affirmative action in the 
appointment of minority MPs, had suffered severe setbacks after 1988: the 
remedying of these injustices, as part of the re-autonomization of 
Vojvodina, could be a contribution to the democratization of the Province 
in terms of restoring inter-ethnic trust. A much less convincing proposal for 
management of ethnic relations is then set in the context of the post-Dayton 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, where Varady does not problematize the violent 
foundations of the two ethnically defined and homogenized ‘entities’ as a 
framework for ethno-cultural justice.
17 
Activities of the umbrella non-governmental organization Humanitarian 
Society Panonija contribute to the revival of sociological and 
anthropological studies of the Vojvodinian regional and inter-ethnic 
identities, and on their popularization in the local media and international 
policy forums. Its most impressive research project, Regional Identity and 
Local Responsibility: A Study of the Vojvodinian Public Opinion, was 
conducted in seven Vojvodinian cities in the aftermath of the 2000 
elections by a team of social scientists from the University of Novi Sad. It 
consisted of a survey on the forms of cultural identification among ordinary 
people in Vojvodina, and their expectations from the anticipated “transition 
to democracy”. The questionnaire of the survey reflects the researchers’ 
intention to define a regional Vojvodinian identity against the background 
of the notion of local responsibility, i.e. “the willingness of residents of 
Vojvodina to contribute to prosperity of their local community”. 
 
17  Tibor Varady, “O sansama za etnokulturnu pravdu u Centralnoj i Istocnoj Evropi - 
sa osvrtom na Dejtonski sporazum“ On the Chances of Ethno-Cultural Justice in 
Central and Eastern Europe – with Referencs to the Dayton Agreement, Habitus, 
No. 0, 2000. 
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 According to the project’s findings, close to fifty per cent of the 
respondents identified with their local community (defined as one’s city of 
residence, and the Province) in comparison to only ten per cent who 
identified with Serbia, over sixty per cent wished for autonomy of 
Vojvodinian economic and cultural institutions (in contrast to twenty per 
cent of those who opted for the status quo), fifty per cent defined their 
vision of “democratic changes” as “economic improvement”, while the 
same percentage believed that their well-being would be improved, if the 
Province were to join regional international associations. 
The breakdown of answers to the question about the preferred political 
status of Vojvodina shows that, with the exception of Montenegrins, more 
than fifty per cent of the respondents within each ethnic group support 
improvements in Vojvodinian economic and cultural autonomy.  
What Status Should Vojvodina Have?
 18  
 
Existing status 
Economic and 
cultural autonomy 
within the Republic 
of Serbia 
Republic within 
the FR
Yugoslavia  Independent state 
Total 
Serbs  77 
23.4% 
202 
61.4% 
37 
11.2% 
13 
4.0% 
329 
100% 
                 
Montenegrins  19 
65.5% 
6 
20.7% 
4 
13.8%   
29 
100% 
                 
Croats  10 
24.4% 
25 
61.0% 
5 
12.2% 
1 
2.4% 
41 
100% 
                 
Hungarians  12 
23.5% 
24 
47.1% 
11 
21.6% 
4 
7.8% 
51 
100% 
                 
Others  23 
35.4% 
27 
41.5% 
11 
16.9% 
4 
6.2 
65 
100% 
This study shows only a minor difference between the two largest ethnic 
groups, Serbs and Hungarians, regarding the issue of Vojvodinian 
autonomy and identification with one’s region and place of residence. The 
 
18 Zsolt Lazar and Dusan Marinkovic, GEOTAKT: Regonalni identitet i lokalna 
odgovornost Regionalno povezivanje Geotakt: Regional Identity and Local Respon-
sibility (Novi Sad: Dobrotvorno drustvo Panonija, 2000). 
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reinstatement of its political and economic autonomy, must reflect its 
residents’ specific forms and hierarchy of identities, which they 
characterize as “interculturalism”. They define “multiculturalism” as a 
form of cultural policy that refers to a society in which several cultures 
coexist side by side, while “interculturalism”  of the Vojvodinian type 
depicts a society characterized by a culture of “dialogical interaction”.
19 
Another study of interethnic relations in Vojvodina, commissioned by the 
Serbian Helsinki Committee for Human Rights, which includes ethnic Serb 
refugees from Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Kosovo who settled in the 
province between 1991 and 1999 (unofficial figures show their numbers to 
be around 300,000) shows a more comprehensive and critical picture of the 
newly emerging “ethnic mind-set”. The most interesting finding of the 
study is that inter-personal interethnic relations between the province’s 
ethnicities are still at similar levels to those detected before 1991. But it 
also points to a newly emerging form of prejudices against groups, which 
are connected to the previously unregistered perceptions of ethnic 
competition. The latter are attributed to the sharp economic decline in the 
1990s (where unemployment is not likely to improve after the 2000 regime 
change), and to the politics of ethnic homogenization, manifested in the 
past regime’s practices of giving concessions-sinecures to leaders of the 
strongest ethic parties. I have in mind here primarily the Alliance of 
Vojvodinian Hungarians, in relation to which the same practice continues 
in the dealings between the currently ruling coalition and ethnic 
Vojvodinian leaders.  
The result of these ethnic politics is, on the one hand, the clustering of 
ethnic aspirants to party positions in bigger cities and a complete lack of 
access to political decision-making in rural areas (for example, over two 
fifths of ethnic Hungarians in Vojvodina live in non-Hungarian majority 
areas), and among less numerous minorities, such as Slovaks and 
 
19  Zsolt Lazar and Dusan Marinkovic, “Od multikulturne prema interkulturnoj Vo-
jvodini“ From Multicultural to Intercultural Vojvodina, unpublished manuscript. 
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 Rumanians. Not surprisingly, the latter negatively respond to questions 
about improvements in collective rights; lacking partisan representation 
and related access to ministerial sinecures and foreign-funded NGO jobs, 
they seek recognition of their individual human rights, and identify to a 
greater extent than Serbs and Hungarians (largest groups) with Vojvodina 
as their home and its autonomist multiethnic parties.  
The study explains the current post-Milosevic wave of ethnic 
homogenization in Vojvodina, spearheaded by ethnic party leaderships and 
by the pre-existing patterns of polity access. It also observes that the 
current “democratization” trends aggravate these patterns due to a greater 
allowance and encouragement for competition between ethnic parties, and 
prospects for opening a range of new posts in the re-constituted 
governmental and parliamentary bodies of the Province. The price for such 
trends is paid by members of smaller ethnic groups, a large number of 
ethnics even of the largest minority nationality who live in non-
homogeneous areas, and refugees who are perceived as competition by all 
ethnicities of Vojvodina, including the Serbs. The results of this 
comprehensive study show new forms of ethnic nationalism-cum-
competition, which distorts the reality of the diminishing resources of the 
Province, as well as its interculturalism, but correctly depicts the rise of a 
new class of aspirants to ethnic “resource pools” and the competition 
between minority nationalities’ elites. The rise of homogenization and 
competition that are typically detected in Western industrialized countries, 
is here often accompanied by claims for the introduction of liberal 
multiculturalism and territorial autonomy for ethnic populations (typical for 
post-Communist states with a previous layout of ethno-federalism): they 
can hardly disguise the scramble for material and status gains in a space of 
Serbia, which arrived to the club of ‘transition societies’ with a decade-
long delay. This study also predicts that a pattern of ethnic competition, if 
pursued between the Vojvodinian ethnic minority leadership and Belgrade 
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the Province.
20 
As stated before, the greatest contribution of the Vojvodinian NGOs lies in 
their dedication to public opinion surveys and project aiming at the 
legitimation of the province’s regional and multiethnic ethos, both of which 
have been neglected by the autonomist multiethnic parties. It should be 
noted that Vojvodinian NGOs, despite their frequent lending of expert 
assistance to the local parties, have kept their critical stance toward the 
autonomist and minority partisan politics, especially toward their long-time 
neglect of the actual grievances of the population and their inability to 
forge lasting coalitions with each other. We should also not forget that until 
2000 NGOs did not have to compete with Serbian ministries and agencies 
for foreign funding: nowadays, funders (especially those from the EU 
states) prefer governmental organizations as recipients of project funds 
over civil society groups, which are inadvertently considered as “having 
done their job”. This tendency may have negative implications for civic 
and political mobilization of ordinary people since it reduces venues for 
democratic participation and activism to party politics alone.  
VI.  Newest Developments after 2000: Horse Trading, 
Sinecure Exchange 
In January 2002, the Serbian Assembly has adopted (with a one-vote 
majority) the so-called “Omnibus Law” (subsequently operationalized in 
June of this year), a package of regulations, which should return certain 
financial and executive prerogatives to the Vojvodinian Assembly. This 
law is conceived as an interim measure aimed at reinstating some of the 
prerogatives of the Vojvodinian autonomy: it corrects some violations of 
the 1990 Constitution of Serbia, which was actually passed as part of 
Slobodan Milosevic’s program of the abolition of Vojvodina’s autonomy 
 
20  Vladimir Ilic, “Minorities and Refugees in a Tangle of Nationalistic Radicaliza-
tion”,  Helsinki Committee in Serbia Files, http:www.Helsinki.org.yu/hcs/ 
HCSfiles8complete.htm 
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 (!). This law returns to the Provincial Assembly the rights to govern its 
health and pension funds, and establish cultural and media institutions 
relevant for the Province’s multiethnic scene. What is more significant is 
that the passing of the “Omnibus Law” coincided with the initiative for 
changes in the Serbian republican Privatization Law, which should now 
allow for fifty per cent of income from the sales of state enterprises in the 
territory of Vojvodina to be retained by the Province (instead of five per 
cent, which was the case before). It also coincided with the distribution of a 
dozen of newly freed mandates in the Serbian Assembly to functionaries of 
the two largest Vojvodinian autonomist parties (the League of Social 
Democrats, and the Vojvodinian Reformists) – the mandates that the 
Democratic Party of the Serbian prime minister Zoran Djindjic had recently 
taken away from the party of his arch-rival Vojislav Kostunica, the current 
president of FR Yugoslavia (under the pretext of the latter’s MPs 
absenteeism). 
The Serbian prime minister did not have to pay for the new liberties of 
Vojvodina too dearly. Omnibus Law’s provisions for health and pension 
funds, while reduced in the course of the parliamentary squabbles from 12 
to 9 billion dinars (200 to 150 million US dollars), are in fact equal to the 
sum that anyway must be spent by the Republic for state expenditures of 
the Province. The privatization sales income (from the sale of Vojvodinian 
cement factories, oil refinery and five sugar plants) would equal to the 
amount of funds, which the republican budget must allocate for the 
reconstruction of industrial infrastructure and restructuring in Vojvodina. It 
should be noted that almost all current income from the privatization of 
state enterprises comes from the sale of Vojvodinian plants, since 95 per 
cent of foreign investors are interested only in the property located north of 
the Sava and Danube rivers. 
These newest seemingly positive developments did not affirm what the 
autonomist Vojvodinian parties had considered for a long as their main 
goal, i.e. a fundamental change in the constitutional position of Vojvodina. 
When an expert commission, staffed by intellectuals from the main 
Vojvodinian civic NGOs, recently submitted to the Vojvodinian MPs (and 
subsequently to the Serbian Assembly) the “Basic Law on Vojvodinian 
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containing the definition of the Province’s autonomy.
21  
In March of 2002, the new federal Law on National Minorities was 
adopted, which was praised in the media by the main Hungarian parties’ 
leaders as “the most advanced law on minorities in Europe”. In the words 
of Tamas Korhec, the Vojvodinian Minister for Minority Issues and a 
leading member of the Alliance of Vojvodinian Hungarians, the Law is 
revolutionary, ‘because it recognizes the right to self-rule in the issues of 
language and culture, and because it was drafted with the expert advice of 
the Council of Europe and the Organization for European Security and 
Cooperation.’
22 The Law is, indeed, innovative in its provisions that street 
names and signs in the ethnically mixed areas, along with personal 
documents of ethnic minority members, would be written in the scripts and 
orthographies of corresponding languages. In reality, the Law on Minorities 
did not change the crucial provision for schooling in one’s mother tongue 
in elementary and high schools: it still postulates that the percentage of 
minority students must be 15 per cent or more. How devastating for the 
preservation of Vojvodina’s ethnic groups’ tongues and cultures this law is, 
can be seen when one remembers that whole villages in Vojvodina have 
become de-populated in the last fifty years because of the “flight to cities”, 
which leaves areas with a high concentration of minority members 
populated by old people.
23 The much lauded Law on Minorities seems to be 
much more applicable to countries like Canada, where ethnic groups had 
settled and concentrated for a long time on separate territories. Even before 
the most recent changes in the demographic distribution, ethnically 
dispersed populations had been a historical characteristic of the Province of 
Vojvodina, with the exception of six predominantly Hungarian 
municipalities in the region of Northern Backa bordering Hungary.  
 
21  Dimitrije Boarov, “Ustavnoj povelji ususret“ Waiting for the Constitutional Charter, 
Helsinki Reports, June 2002, http://www.helsinki. org.yuhcs/ HCS2002Jun12.htm 
22 http://www.vmsz.org.yu/sh/onama/cikk.php?id=32 
23  In addition, approximately 50,000 younger Vojvodinian Hungarians have left the 
Province in the last 10 years, avoiding the military draft: at least half of them have 
subsequently found jobs and settled in Hungary. 
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 Deplorably, what seems to matter most with regard to the new law on 
minorities is the fact that the largest Hungarian party can feel victorious 
since it satisfies parts of its demands for territorial autonomy. In other 
words, with the high 15 per cent in the population census line, less than 
three fifths of Vojvodinian Hungarians could hope to receive education in 
their mother tongue, while over two fifths of territorially dispersed 
Hungarians would be left without it. Local leaders of the dispersed 
Hungarians have been in the meantime offered party jobs and offices in the 
cities of Novi Sad and Subotica. The plight of the less numerous minorities, 
such as Slovaks, Romanians and Ruthenians, is left to be discussed and 
studied by the NGO forums in which the intellectual elites of these 
populations could also find jobs and access to project funding.  
Horse-trading seems to have become the predominant pattern of political 
behavior in the aftermath of the DOS-coalition (of 16 parties) victory in 
2000. In the case of leaders of both multiethnic and Hungarian Vojvodinian 
parties, it is a strategy by which they secure important ministerial and 
similar sinecures in the Serbian and Vojvodinian bodies, despite the fact 
that they have been systematically unsuccessful in promoting the laws that 
would significantly alter Vojvodina’s second-class status in Serbia, and in 
the face of the fact that they had not been able to mobilize any significant 
following among the population. Vladimir Ilic, a Belgrade sociologist who 
analyzes the Serbian political scene after 2000 in the vein of Max Weber’s 
work on political parties, observes that Vojvodinian autonomists are not 
able to disguise that they are more interested in ‘institutional dimensions’ 
of autonomy, which means high executive posts and sinecures, than in its 
economic dimension, which is otherwise presented as a top priority in the 
party programs focusing on “economic exploitation of Vojvodina”.
24 Such 
politics, in the context of the previously outlined socio-economic 
grievances of the population that are shared across ethnic lines, can 
mobilize only the followers of narrow party circles, i.e. the aspirants to 
high posts. Trade-offs are obviously worth ignoring the needs of (and need 
 
24  Vladimir Ilic, “Maks Veber i politicke stranke u Vojvodini“ Max Weber and Politi-
cal Parties in Vojvodina http://www.helsinki.org.yu/ povelja/ pov1199/091199.html 
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In this tangle of events, Vojvodinian multiethnic and minority parties can 
claim “victories” without developing any concrete stance toward the issues 
that would be a direct response to the pressing grievances of ordinary 
people. Vojvodinian parties seem to have little trust in their own 
constituency building, and gain confidence only when growing closer to 
one of the two dominant Belgrade-based party blocks. Not surprisingly, 
precisely at such times, their pro-autonomy rhetoric tends to become 
exceptionally radical: in response, indicators of the future abstinence vote 
in Vojvodina have been rising dramatically in 2002, for the first time after 
the 2000 regime change.
25  
It seems that as long as the laws on minority rights or those on reinstating 
the bits and pieces of the Province’s autonomy can be passed in the Serbian 
parliament, and as long as relevant posts are being distributed “in good 
faith”, chances for making the cause of Vojvodinian autonomy politically 
relevant for its population are minuscule. Simultaneously, a form of 
compliance “with Europe” will be maintained.  
The outlined recent developments in Vojvodina point to the processes 
which are relevant for an understanding of the relationship between the 
lack of mobilizational success of Vojvodinian regionalism and the new 
variety of ethnic politics in Serbia, and the related problems of applying 
multiculturalism as a theoretical and practical scheme of culture and 
politics for Vojvodina. The rules of “ethnic” polity access in Serbia, and in 
the province of Vojvodina in particular, inherited from the reign of 
Slobodan Milosevic, seem to be surviving in the era of his successors. 
Horse-trading between the Vojvodinian multiethnic and ethnic minority 
regional parties seems to have become more relevant than the goal of the 
province’s economic and political autonomy and the building of a broad 
political base. Subsequently, the actual grievances of ordinary 
Vojvodinians are subsumed under ‘ethnic-cultural’ problems and cannot be 
 
25  Dissatisfied Vojvodina residents, Medija center Belgrade analytical service, 27 Ju-
ne, 2001, http://www.yumediacenter.com/english/as/2001/7/a260701e.asp 
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 recognized as relevant discontents and forms of identity and solidarity. To 
these topics, I turn in the concluding remarks. 
VII.  Broadening the Scope: “Democratic Nationalism”, 
Multiculturalism, and Multiculturality 
In the first week following the 2000 demise of Slobodan Milosevic, a 
leading Serbian intellectual, close to the party of the Yugoslav president 
Vojislav Kostunica, outlined in one of the main Belgrade daily papers the 
doctrine of the new Serbian “democratic nationalism”.
26 In this article, he 
distinguishes between the “wrong” Serb nationalism of Slobodan 
Milosevic’s era, which is characterized by the authoritarian treatment of its 
own nation and others and an expansionist-violent agenda. This 
nationalism is contrasted with an “European” brand of Serbian nationalism, 
which, according to the author, extols its own nation above others because 
it is a product of a democratic process and thereby provides a necessary 
“integrative glue” that comes from the “core-nation” and binds all citizens 
into a legitimate polity worthy of loyalty and patriotism. In this picture, the 
blame for the decade of nationalistic wars is squarely put on the shoulders 
of the dethroned authoritarian regime, and the Serbian nation is presented 
as a principal victim of Milosevic’s policies: the latter are simultaneously 
portrayed as the legacy of Communism, which had supposedly created an 
unnatural break in the Serbian history. The “bête noire” of totalitarianism 
thus becomes a mantra and an alleged antipode of “democratic 
nationalists”. 
It seems that the latest endeavors of Serbian “democratic nationalists” to 
“normalize” the majority nationalism by endowing it with integrative and 
“participatory” features reflect two defensive political agendas: one has to 
do with the continuous denial of the new Serbian authorities to open a 
public debate on war crimes and the role of Serb forces in the operations of 
ethnic cleansing in Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo; the other is 
 
26  Svetozar Stojanovic, “Nations, Nationalism, Citizenry”, Danas, 14 October 2000. 
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the ranks of victorious parties. While the latter are being criticized for 
“patriotism deficiency”, i.e. the supposedly unnatural inability to “criticize 
other nations”, they are simultaneously invited to establish an alliance with 
“democratic nationalists”. The strategy of the uniting of the previously 
irreconcilable blocks – salon nationalist intellectuals and antiwar 
antinationalist activists – serves to “thwart the tackling of responsibility 
among those who in the past decade together with the authoritarian 
nationalists pursued, backed and masterminded the now defeated policy”.
27 
But there is more to the new Serbian doctrine of “democratic nationalism”. 
In the last two years, the shaky Serbian coalition has braced itself for the 
path of reforms. The delayed post-communist integration in the dominant 
European context brings with it the reality of becoming a part of the 
European semi-periphery, where the much awaited foreign investment will 
be, for some years ahead, used primarily for repayment and rescheduling of 
the debt, rather than for the re-building of the country’s economy and 
improvement of living standards. In combination with the situation in 
Kosovo, which is an international protectorate still referred to as “part of 
the Serbian land”, this dependence of Serbia on international sponsorship 
comes into a state of affinity with the new ethnicization of issues of 
democratic citizenship. Bound to respond to every pressure of international 
organizations for its economic policies and human and minority rights laws 
(to which the previous regime had responded with isolationist policies and 
schemes of violence over territory), and forced to neutralize and white-
wash their own responsibility for supporting and condoning the war-
waging policies of Milosevic, the Serbian elites have found themselves in a 
vacuum of legitimacy, where nationalism with the face of a “democratic 
Serb” would fill the void. 
The lack of mobilization success by autonomist Vojvodinian parties, which 
by now should be diagnosed as an abandonment of the goals of the 
Province’s autonomy, fits into the scheme of this polity access scheme-in-
 
27 Vladimir Ilic, “Retouching Notions: Normalizing Nationalism”, http://helsinki. 
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 the-making. What is abandoned among the goals of autonomy are the 
existing grievances of the population that have been continuously 
marginalized by a mix of the radical autonomist rhetoric and the politics of 
horse-trading and co-optation by the Belgrade-based parties. Now, perhaps 
even more than before in Serbia, polity access means, among other things, 
a successful use of “cultural” (ethnic or quasi-ethnic) issues, as only they 
seem to offer legitimacy, the scarcest resource in Serbia. The rhetoric of 
protecting regional autonomy, or, in the case of the Hungarian largest 
party’s leadership, protecting one’s own ethnic minority, means imitation 
of the new “moderate” Serb nationalists: all parts of this triad have interest 
in promoting a sum of some “pure” nationalisms – regionalist, minority or 
majority, at the expense of mobilizing civic or inter-ethnic allegiances and 
solidarities. The new perceptions of ethnic competition, depicted in 
Vladimir Ilic’s survey on Vojvodinian minorities and refugees testify to the 
dramatic effects that this political scheme has on inter-ethnic relations on 
the ground. 
Broadening political participation seems to be the field into which Serbian 
elites do not dare to venture. In this context, what use can we find for Will 
Kymlicka’s prescriptions for liberal multiculturalism-nationalism as the 
basis of democratic transitions in East-Central Europe? First, democracy in 
this scheme is obviously perceived as a correction of the previously 
violated or suppressed ethnic identities, which Kymlicka tends to identify 
with “culture” and “rights”. However, to diagnose ethnonationalist wars in 
the former Yugoslavia as being caused by the unresolved issues of ethnic 
autonomy means to turn the understanding of the conflict on its head. As 
several sociological and anthropological accounts of the breakdown of the 
Yugoslav federation have shown, the violence that took place in the most 
ethnically mixed areas of the country was not a spontaneous eruption of 
ethnic hatreds or an outcome of unsettled issues of ethnic autonomy. It was 
for the most part imported from outside in the communities “where the 
lived realities of complex societies most directly contradicted the imagining 
of political space in ethnically homogeneous terms”. The worst kind of 
 
org.yu/hcs/HCS2000DecVilic.htm 
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the realities on the ground of ethnically mixed communities and their 
culture. “Violence and threats were necessary to ethnicisize a society that 
had until then not been divided along those lines.”
28 In a society that had 
been characterized by a complex long-lasting social and economic crisis, 
such as the one that pervaded the Yugoslav society during the 1980s, 
ethnicity became a vehicle of the consolidation of patronage networks of 
political control during the transition from the Communist to a pluralist 
political framework.
29 These accounts of the violent and organized 
character of the breakdown of the Yugoslav state put into serious question 
the applicability of the thesis that ethnic autonomies and ethnic politics are 
the best remedies for the condition of “democratic deficit” in the post-
socialist and post-violence multiethnic states. 
Even if we accept the package of “ethnocultural justice” as a useful 
impetus for protecting minority languages and cultural institutions, we 
ought to be reminded that in the arena where individual rights and 
economic existence are precarious, insistence on collective rights, as an 
ascribed citizenship marker, may act as further hindrance of democratic 
participation. The Serbian politics of ethnic majority-minority and region-
center trading shows that the interests of local elites in the tenets of liberal 
multiculturalism-nationalism may be motivated less by their demo-
cratization agendas than by their need to bypass the imperatives of broader 
participation.  
Will Kymlicka’s liberal-democratic benevolent state that simultaneously 
dispenses individual (same for all) and collective (based on ascribed 
membership) rights is not a reality even in Western liberal states – which 
had homogenized their ethnic differences not because of their ignorance, 
but as part of state building agendas. It is, at best, an attempt to make a 
 
28  Chip Gagnon, “Serbs as Victims and Perpetrators of Violence”, paper presented at 
the Conference on Comparative Minority Issues, Vienna, April 11-14, 2001. 
29  Anthony Oberschall, “The manipulation of ethnicity: from ethnic cooperation to 
violence and war in Yugoslavia”, Ethnic and Racial Studies, Vol. 23, No. 6 (No-
vember 2000), pp. 982-1002. 
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 critical move away from the patterns of discrimination of populations 
whose linguistic and other cultural characteristics had been used to shrink 
access to major resources. However, the doctrine of liberal 
multiculturalism, as the case of Vojvodina shows, may serve precisely the 
opposite goal, i.e., the transportation of state-majority-nationalist closures 
to sub-state levels. 
In the end, where can one look for reliable barriers against 
ethnonationalism in an area where “ethnic trade” has proven useful for both 
authoritarian-isolationist and reformist-globalizing elites? How can the 
survival of multicultural individuals be supported? The only durable 
option, it seems, lies in the civic sector, among NGOs who would persist in 
acting as pressure groups upon their elites escaping accountability: by 
tenaciously researching and publicizing the findings on structural conflict, 
grievances, cultural preferences, and the rest of realities of the insecure and 
resilient everyday life. This, then, opens a new line of research on the 
discrepancies and congruencies between the desirable modes of broad 
democratic participation and the interests behind the policies of 
multiculturalism in the post-socialist “transitional” societies and the 
neighboring and ever closer European Union. 
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Papers: 
Hans Vermeulen and Boris Slijper, Multiculturalism and Culturalism: A 
Social Scientific Critique of the Political Philosophy of Multiculturalism 
Ana Devic, Nationalism, Regional Multiculturalism and Democracy in the 
Province of Vojvodina, Serbia’s Multiethnic Haven 
 
Broader reasons for including these two papers in the curricula of Master’s 
programs in European Studies are that they focus on some of the most de-
bated issues in social science and politics today: the role of cultural identity 
in shaping state, pan- and trans-state, and civil society politics, and the cur-
rent European ambiguities with regard to the alleged opposition between 
nationalism and multiculturalism. 
The papers should invite interdisciplinary answers to the following broad 
questions: What are similarities and differences in current manifestations 
and causes of ethnic and state nationalisms in the West and the post-
socialist Europe? What are the (common or dissimilar) reasons for the in-
creasing articulation of social conflicts in cultural terms in Europe today – 
East and West?  
How helpful is the theory of liberal multiculturalism in unraveling these 
issues? Can the theory and policies stemming from liberal multiculturalism 
promote democratization and cooperative diversity, or can they spur ethnic 
and national particularisms and autarky? What is the role of civic identity 
and solidarity in combating ethnic and national exclusivism in contempo-
rary Europe? 
More detailed theoretical and historical discussions can include the follow-
ing points: 
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1.  Blurred distinctions between ethnic and civic concepts of the nation 
2.  The changing role of the State 
3.  Civic citizenship as a barrier to the confounding of national with ethnic                          
4.  Continuities of socialist and post-socialist ethnonationalism 
5.  Immigration in the “Old Europe,” “New Right” and “legitimate nation-
alism” 
6.  Regionalism and a Common European Space. Confronting nationalism 
through trans-state solidarity and Action  
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